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Strategic management research frequently seeks to explain variation in organizational 
performance using metrics such as accounting profits scaled by firm assets (ROA).  
Essay 1 addresses a concern with such accrual-based accounting methods—perhaps 
best illustrated by a large discontinuity in the distribution of ROA around zero for 
U.S. public firms—that operational and accounting practices will artificially 
inflate/deflate accounting profit. The essay establishes that such earnings management 
is common, introduces non-classical noise, and distorts our understanding of broad 
drivers of firm performance. It concludes with an analysis showing that an alternative 
performance measure, Cash Flows from Operations on Assets (OCFOA), offers a 
robust vehicle for checking results using accounting profits. 
  
Essay 2 addresses a core prediction of the behavioral theory of the firm—that a firm is 
more likely to engage in strategic change when its performance falls short of its 
aspirations. If a firm manipulates income to report above aspirations when otherwise 
it would have fallen short, this creates a theoretical tension—does the firm engage in 
strategic change or not? This study utilizes two instrumental variables for a firm’s 
capability to smooth earnings to analyze the linkage between earnings smoothing and 
strategic change. The results suggest that public firms actively smoothing earnings 
have a lower propensity to subsequently change the firm’s major resource allocations, 
and that avoiding reporting performance below aspirations is a mechanism through 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
This dissertation explores the phenomenon of firms inflating or deflating 
profits to strategically report accounting profit, known as earnings management. I 
study the effect of earnings management on how scholars understand the drivers of 
firm performance as well as on the firms’ downstream resource allocation decisions. 
The essays in this document are intended to address two broad research questions: 
First, does the firm’s endogenous choice to manipulate reported earnings introduce 
bias in econometric models designed to understand, predict, or control for firm 
performance? Second, does a firm engaging in the choice to manipulate earnings to 
smooth out reported profits dampen the performance feedback process, and thus 
engage in less subsequent strategic change? Both questions address calls to further 
knowledge of how firm performance is measured, interpreted, and manipulated 
(Richard et al., 2009; Lieberman, 2021). 
THE CENTRALITY OF FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Perhaps the most central question of strategic management research is how 
firms gain and sustain competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). Firms create and 
capture value by managing a stock of resources and successful firms are thought to 
have either superior resources and/or a superior way of organizing and deploying 
their resources compared to their less successful competitors (Barney, 1991). 
Competition between firms seeking to create and capture value “acts to direct 





freedom of market exchange provide increased prosperity more broadly for society 
(Smith, 1776).  
The mechanism of relative firm performance guiding resources toward their 
most productive use is particularly important in capital markets for publicly traded 
corporations. Firms with publicly offered common stock are required to report 
financial accounting data quarterly and annually according to generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP) for companies listed in the U.S.1, and to the 
international financial reporting standards (IFRS) for those listed in most other 
jurisdictions2. Many entities rely on these public financial reports to decide whether 
to infuse or withdraw resources to the firm, including equity investors, corporate 
bondholders, and potential mergers and acquisitions (M&A) counterparties. These 
stakeholders use information on the firm’s performance as presented in the 
accounting statements as a key input in decision-making on whether or not to invest 
in, divest from, lend to, acquire, merge, or be acquired by the firm; given this, it is no 
wonder that stock prices (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002) and the cost of debt 
(Jiang, 2008) are sensitive to accounting measures of performance, particularly 
earnings relative to salient benchmarks.  
In addition to the participants in capital markets, the public more broadly 










firms. As Lieberman (2021) points out, the notion of competitive advantage implies 
that a given firm has better performance than another, and he suggests that the 
study of superior performance is a cornerstone of strategic management 
scholarship. He proceeds to note the myriad ways that firm performance has been 
defined in the literature, most of the which involve a form of accounting profit.3 As 
competitive advantage through superior performance is the most central topic of 
study in strategic management, so accounting profit is the most common way that 
firm performance is operationalized. 
ACCOUNTING PROFITS AS PERFORMANCE MEASURE 
It is sensible that accounting profit is used to judge firm performance. Profit 
is simply revenue (a measure of the value customers place on the final product or 
service) minus cost (a measure of the value of resources consumed in creating the 
product or service), which represents the most basic calculation of value created and 
captured by a firm’s economic activity. By comparing the value of the various inputs 
before business activity to the total price paid by customers for the outputs of that 
business activity, the value created by the activity is thus measured in accounting 
profit (on a balance sheet, this value is represented by net income).  
When comparing firms within and across industries, it is common to scale the 
raw earnings number by some measure of the size of the firm. An annual net income 
 
 
3 For example, Lieberman mentions economic profit, which is derived from accounting profit by also 
applying the opportunity cost of capital. As described earlier, even the cost of capital is affected by 





of 10 million USD may be quite impressive for a small growth firm but seen as wholly 
inadequate for Apple, Inc. The particular scalar used for firm size varies with the 
particular aim of the observer. For example, scaling by the firm’s revenues (return 
on sales) may be informative if an observer is trying to predict the potential profit of 
expanding the size of operations. Scaling by the total value of common stock (return 
on equity) or on the number of shares outstanding (earnings per share) is of interest 
to equity investors to gauge the residual profits generated by the various 
components of their portfolio, but this measure is more sensitive to the debt/equity 
structure of a company than is return on invested capital. As is discussed in Chapter 
2, a ubiquitous performance measure for strategic management research is return 
on assets (ROA), which scales the accounting profit of a firm by the total of the 
assets listed on its balance sheet. This has the advantage of being insensitive to 
financial leverage and being comparable across industries engaged in very different 
work (e.g., one can compare a software development firm to an oil drilling firm even 
though the type of assets owned by each are quite different).  
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Managers recognize the importance of earnings as a metric (Graham, Harvey, 
and Rajgopal, 2005) and are incentivized to report earnings at or above key 
thresholds such as previous performance, gains vs. losses (zero profit), financial 
analyst consensus expectations, or the earnings of industry peers (Burgstahler and 
Dichev, 1997; Du and Shen, 2018). There are both individual-level incentives 





compensation through salary/bonus, increasing the value of stock-based 
compensation by boosting the share price, or the psychological satisfaction of 
attaining goals) as well as firm-level incentives (lowering the cost of capital, avoiding 
breach of debt covenants, building a reputation for trustworthiness or consistency 
with shareholders and financial analysts, increase the stock price in anticipation for a 
merger or stock-based acquisition, etc.) for reporting above thresholds (Ronen and 
Yaari, 2008). 
When these incentives guide managers to seek profitable projects and 
investments, to make processes efficient, and to give and inspire additional marginal 
effort from employees, these incentives should be generally aligned with value 
creation. However, there are techniques to temporarily inflate or deflate reported 
accounting profit that decouple the reported value with the actual underlying 
financial position of the business. Earnings management occurs when managers use 
such discretion over accounting or operational decisions to strategically report profit 
(Phillips et al., 2003).  
The specific techniques managers use to adjust profits strategically are well 
summarized by Ronen and Yaari (2015, p. 258; 2008, p. 42-55), but in general 
concept, they rely on two types of discretion managers can exert: 1) the timing of 
events, for example, when revenues or expenses are recognized, when write-offs, 
impairments, or adjustments are made, when new accounting standards are 
implemented, or when assets are liquidated; and 2) when the manager must make a 





credit customers are unlikely to pay, how many years a new piece of equipment is 
expected to last, or what potential financial penalty may be incurred due to a 
pending lawsuit or regulatory breach. A certain amount of discretion in timing or 
valuation of uncertainty is necessary within accounting standards, as managers are 
arguably in the best position to make such calls; restricting regulations within GAAP 
and IFRS to try to eliminate all such discretion would be counterproductive (if even 
possible). Additionally, it is difficult to know a priori whether a particular judgment 
call is manipulative or truly the manager’s best estimate in good faith. Even post hoc 
detection is imperfect, as despite public firms being required to undergo annual 
external audits, a substantial portion still are subject to enforced penalties and 
restatement (Harris and Bromiley, 2007) and as the share price increase to meeting 
earnings thresholds persists even when there is suspected earnings or expectations 
management (Bartov, Givoly, and Hayn, 2002). 
The factors driving earnings management can roughly be categorized into 
‘motive’ or ‘opportunity’ factors. First order factors that motivate earnings 
management include events or conditions where there is direct benefit conditional 
on earnings being either inflated or deflated. For example, a firm at risk of violating 
debt covenants may manipulate the timing of accruals to increase earnings (DeFond 
and Jiambolvo, 1994). Firm managers themselves may have a direct benefit from 
earnings higher than salient thresholds due to the triggering of targets for bonus 





Nurullah, 2019). These first order factors can be identified by the direct incentive to 
the firm or the relevant top management team members. 
There are also second order effects that motivate earnings management by 
anticipation that posting earnings above certain thresholds will elicit a positive 
reaction in the stock market or will increase the status or reputation of the firm or 
its top managers. There is evidence that top management teams manipulate 
earnings more to drive up the stock price when executive compensation has a large 
proportion of stock-based compensation (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006). 
Additionally, firms anticipating mergers or acquisitions with a stock component 
seem to use earnings manipulation to boost their own share price before the 
transaction (e.g., Ardekani, Younesi, and Hashemijoo, 2012; Meisel, 2007; Zhu and 
Lu, 2013). While these are motives of tangible benefits from driving a share price 
higher, there is also a reputational motive for both the firm and its executives. 
Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005) found that major motivations for CFOs to 
meet earnings benchmarks was to “build credibility with [the] capital market” and to 
enhance the “external reputation of management”. 
In addition to the factors that motivate earnings management behavior, 
there are also conditions that constrain or enable the flexibility and discretion used 
for such manipulation. This includes broad statutory or regulatory changes 
impacting accounting standards and practice, for example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (SOX), but also includes industry or firm-specific factors. A firm’s governance 





vis à vis outside directors (Baker et al., 2019), and the composition and activities of 
shareholders such as the relative proportion of institutional investors, the presence 
of shareholder activism, etc. (Hadani, Goranova, and Khan, 2011) can also enable or 
constrain management’s ability to manage earnings in addition to their incentives to 
do so. 
RESEARCH AGENDA 
Many of the factors that drive or mitigate earnings management behavior 
relate to core questions of value creation and thus to strategic decisions made by 
the firm. It is at these intersections that issues about the accuracy of reported 
earnings and the quality of a firm’s earnings (i.e., the likelihood that they will 
endure) cross over to core strategic decisions, such as how firms position for, 
execute, and integrate after mergers and acquisitions; how senior management is 
compensated to best align stakeholder interests; or what organizational and 
governance structure provides effective oversight of activities most efficiently. This 
poses interesting questions about whether firms make such strategic decisions, in 
part, to later facilitate more flexibility to manage earnings, or if the decision to 
manage earnings now has effects on subsequent strategic decisions of the firm. It 
also calls into question whether the disconnect between reported performance and 
the underlying truth for a given period could lead us astray as scholars studying the 
antecedents of such performance. 
The two essays presented in this dissertation are part of an overall research 





and practice of strategic management. The research will fall into three categories. 
The first category is to examine the effect of earnings manipulation on econometric 
models of interest to strategy scholars. The second and third category are to look at 
strategic decisions downstream and upstream, respectively, of a firm engaging in 
earnings manipulation.  
Measurement / Econometric Effects 
Essay 1 of this dissertation provides quantitative estimates of the extent of 
earnings management among public firms and estimates the non-classical 
measurement error present in publicly reported income numbers. By using an 
algorithmic bunching estimator pioneered by scholars in economics (Chetty, 2012; 
Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Diamond and Persson, 2016), discontinuities in the 
distribution of annual firm ROA are compared against iterative counterfactual 
functional forms to estimate 1) the range of probable earnings management, and 2) 
how much mass has shifted from one part of the distribution to the other. 
Operational cash flows over assets (OCFOA) is used as an alternative measure to 
serve as a counterfactual for the distribution of ROA to account for endogenous firm 
effort near aspirational thresholds. An updated study in the decomposition of 
variance of profitability is conducted in the spirit of McGahan and Porter (1997; 
2002) and Mackey (2008) to revisit how much variance in profit can be explained 
through various components. The results suggest that earnings management 





points, as well as shifting our understanding of how much variance each individual 
component explains. 
I plan to extend this work to apply the findings to previous empirical work in 
strategy, particularly on studies of top management team (TMT) effects. As earnings 
management behavior is driven substantially by the CEO, the CFO, and the 
governance structures within which they operate (Ronen and Yaari, 2015), the non-
classical measurement error caused by should be particularly salient for studies 
attempting to equate TMT or governance characteristics to subsequent performance 
or strategic change. Rather than focus on one constructive replication of a well-
known finding, this work would take a comprehensive look at the literature stream 
to look for common patterns of bias—e.g., CEO narcissism (Chatterjee and 
Hambrick, 2007; Ham et al., 2017) may have an overstated effect on performance, 
as earnings management may lead to the identification of CEOs who are more 
aggressively manipulating rather than more effectively managing. This is the primary 
concern that earnings management could threaten inference; if we as scholars 
misinterpret being more aggressive in earnings management as being good at 
creating value because we take reported earnings at face value, this could lead us 
astray in our efforts to understand and explain superior performance. 
The other planned addition to this work is to create a guide of which factors 
important to management and organizational theory are most strongly correlated 
with earnings management, along with tangible examples of econometric models 





work but provide sensemaking of the existing knowledge as a guide for future work 
in this area.  
Downstream Effects of Earnings Management 
Essay 2 of this dissertation examines the causal relationship between a firm’s 
earnings smoothing activity and subsequent propensity for strategic change. This 
essay explores the implication of the core prediction of the behavioral theory of the 
firm—that a firm is more likely to engage in strategic change when its performance 
falls short of its aspirations. If by engaging in earnings smoothing, managers are 
more likely to report earnings above aspirations, does this then suppress future 
change? The study includes two instrumental variables to aid causal identification: 1) 
the influence of earnings smoothing by industry peers and 2) variation in special 
items.  
The results suggest that firms that smooth earnings are more likely to report 
earnings above organizational aspirations than firms who do not. This effect holds 
for four different types of organizational aspirations (previous year performance, 
average industry performance, positive vs. negative profit, and analyst consensus 
expectations), but the effect seems to be strongest for posting non-negative 
earnings. Furthermore, earnings smoothing leads to a lower propensity to change 
major resource allocations (R&D spending, SG&A spending, debt/equity ratio, etc.) 
in subsequent periods. Approximately 40 percent of the effect of earnings 
smoothing to lower subsequent strategic change is accounted for by whether or not 





Thinking about mechanism by which aspiration attainment mediates the 
effect of earnings smoothing on strategic change raises interesting implications for 
performance feedback theory. While it is widely accepted in this literature that 
performance below aspirations engenders organizational search and change (Gavetti 
et al., 2012) in this case, earnings smoothing is decoupling the performance that is 
reported publicly from the underlying actual performance for any given time period. 
If one takes the perspective that managers actively manipulating earnings have 
private information on what the counterfactual unmanipulated earnings would be 
(and thus that they would have fallen short of the salient aspiration save for the 
manipulation), then this would imply that part of the classic performance feedback 
findings around performance shortfalls and change is due to pressures or 
expectations external to the firm management. These external pressures come from 
users of reported financial data, including shareholders, analysts, bondholders, and 
counterparties for future transactions. 
If one relaxes the assumption that managers smoothing earnings have a clear 
understanding of what their counterfactual unmanipulated earnings would have 
been, this opens up other interesting mechanisms. For example, scholars from a 
sociological lens studying the budgeting process of a firm as ritual describe a process 
of negotiation and “reification” resulting in the formal budget (Mazmanian and 
Beckman, 2018). In practice, once the process of creating financial statements 





outside the firm, even to the point of reducing or eliminating the salience of ‘how 
the sausage was made’ in the first place. 
I plan to extend this work by exploring whether the negative relationship 
between earnings smoothing and strategic change described above is a mechanism 
by which firms go down the slippery slope to outright financial fraud. Chu et al. 
(2019) present results suggesting that firms that consistently meet or beat earnings 
estimates are more likely to engage in outside-of-GAAP fraud. And in their work on 
firm financial restatements prompted by SEC sanction, Harris and Bromiley (2007) 
propose an extension of the traditional performance feedback model that when 
firms fall short of their aspirations, they can choose to lie about their financial 
position (i.e., engage in financial manipulation outside of discretion allowed under 
GAAP) rather than engage in search and change. This substitution effect could 
happen earlier in the process, and earnings management suppressing strategic 
change through aspiration attainment could be the causal mechanism underlying 
the results seen by both Chu et al. and Harris and Bromiley. By applying a similar 
instrumental variable approach as in Essay 2 for identification, the work could then 
be extended to look at the likelihood for subsequent SEC enforcement actions on 
smoothing firms and test whether low strategic change precedes this effect. 
Upstream Effects of Earnings Management 
Just as there are downstream strategic decisions that are enabled or 
constrained by engaging in earnings management, there are many questions to 





manage earnings later. A TMT that sees earnings management as part of “playing 
the game” and that is willing to sacrifice some long-term value for the short-term 
benefit of smooth or reliable earnings (see Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal, 2005) 
may make resource gathering or allocation decisions on the front end to give 
themselves such flexibility or to reduce the cost (or chance of detection) of 
manipulation. 
There are two projects I intend to explore on precursors to earnings 
management. The first is whether firms that subsequently engage in manipulation 
choose certain types of projects to greenlight or assets to acquire that give them 
ample discretion in timing or valuation of financial events. This could include internal 
R&D or external business development opportunities (e.g., M&A targets). This study 
could look at either a process level (such as the different hurdles applied during 
project evaluation) or by examining the characteristics actual projects funded or 
companies acquired.  
The second project is to examine the organizational structure of a firm that 
enable subsequent earnings management. There are plausible treatment and 
selection effects that could be operating here. A possible treatment effect would be 
a new CEO or CFO that wants to engage in more manipulation implementing 
organizational changes to centralize authority regarding key levers of earnings 
management. The selection effect could occur on either side of the two-sided 
market to place top executives in the role. A CEO or CFO who was willing to engage 





structured to enable this as an option. On the other side of the market, scholars 
have explored how firms seeing the need for earnings management may recruit top 
executives with ‘morally flexible’ personality traits proactively (Harris et al., 2021). If 
this is true, it stands to reason that the organization would also adopt or maintain a 
structure giving those recruited managers the tools to accomplish the earnings 
management sought. 





Chapter 2: Does Earnings Management Matter for Strategy 
Research?4 
INTRODUCTION 
Investors, managers, and scholars all rely on accounting-based measures of 
public firm performance. A cursory search on Google Scholar, for example, yields 
over 22,000 papers, distributed over multiple fields, containing the terms 
“Compustat” and “Return on Assets.” This prevalence partly reflects a long tradition 
of using accounting data to study both the drivers of profitability (McGahan and 
Porter, 1997, 2002), and the persistence of performance (Rumelt et al., 1991; 
D’Aveni et al., 2010). Moreover, reporting of accounting measures is mandated for 
publicly traded firms, providing scholars with metrics that are comparable, 
convenient, and broadly accepted as important.  
At the same time, there is a substantial accounting literature on earnings 
management, defined as reporting that aims to “mislead some stakeholders about 
the underlying economic performance of the company or influence contractual 
outcomes that depend on reported accounting numbers” (Healy and Wahlen, 
1999).5 Although our impression is that scholars studying firm performance are 
generally aware that accounting adjustments can obscure the link between real and 
 
 
4 This chapter is co-authored with Dr. Timothy Simcoe and Dr. David Waguespack. 
5 We use the term “earnings manipulation” to describe discretionary reporting decisions permitted 
under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) that strategically inflate or deflate 





reported performance, we find very few citations to the relevant accounting 
research in fields such as strategy, finance, and economics.6 We speculate that this 
omission reflects the fact that manipulation, an activity that is by definition hidden, 
is hard to systematically assess. Moreover, scholars may implicitly assume that any 
“noise” in accrual accounting will balance out within the firm over time, and that the 
market will detect non-trivial misreporting.  
In this manuscript we first establish that earnings management is common, 
introduces non-classical noise, and distorts our understanding of broad drivers of 
firm performance. We begin with a simple model of incentives to manipulate 
earnings that predicts bunching in reported earnings just above the zero returns 
threshold. We then turn to data from Compustat and Execucomp and document a 
discontinuity in the distribution of Return on Assets (ROA) at zero profits, and 
employ a bunching estimator (Chetty, 2012; Kleven and Waseem, 2013) to estimate 
that approximately 15 percent of firm-year observations are shifted from negative to 
positive profitability. While striking, this shift in the distribution of ROA could reflect 
endogenous effort (i.e., striving harder when within striking distance of a goal) as 
well as accounting tricks. Therefore, we next demonstrate that for Cash Flows from 
Operations on Assets (OCFOA), an alternative accounting measure that is arguably 
less subject to manipulation, only approximately four percent of observations shift 
 
 
6 For example, at the time of this writing, the seminal study of earnings management by Burgstahler 
and Dichev (1997) had been cited over 5,000 times. It received one citation in Strategic Management 
Journal, three in the Academy of Management Journal, five in the Journal of Finance, and none in the 





from the negative to positive region. Finally, we conduct a decomposition of 
variance, in the spirit of canonical analyses found in Schmalensee (1985), Rumelt et 
al. (1991), and McGahan and Porter (1997, 2002), comparing results based on ROA 
versus OCFOA. We find that earnings management may obfuscate 10 percent or 
more of the variance in earnings that scholars can predict using these factors; and 
moreover, the manipulation changes the relative importance of industry-, firm-, and 
CEO-level factors. 
The issues of performance measurement and the match to theoretical 
constructs are of long-standing concern in management scholarship (Winter, 1995; 
Lieberman, 2021). An emerging stream of recent work has addressed deficiencies in 
accounting measures, such as the distinction between average and marginal profit 
maximization (Levinthal and Wu, 2010; Shapira and Shaver, 2014), short- versus 
long-term value creation (Wibbens and Siggelkow, 2020), cleavages between value 
creation and capture (Lieberman et al., 2017), and the ability of firms to leverage 
non-owned assets (Barney, 2019). We contribute to this line of work by 
documenting how accrual accounting may systematically obscure understanding of 
the relationship between firm policies and outcomes, and by offering the relatively 
simple solution of checking results with an alternative accounting measure. While 
we embed our variance decomposition analysis within a broad line of empirical 
inquiry, we believe there is much potential for strategy scholars to examine whether 





THEORY: EARNINGS MANIPULATION AND BUNCHING 
This section presents a simplified model of earning management, based on 
the more general treatment in Kleven (2016). Our model includes a single firm 
whose true performance is a random variable denoted by π. The CEO observes her 
firm’s performance and makes a report 𝑅 = 𝜋 + 𝑎, where a represents accounting 
adjustments. In our empirical context, 𝑅 corresponds to publicly reported 
accounting-based performance measures. 
We assume that adjustments incur a quadratic cost 𝑐(𝑎) =
𝛾𝑎2
2
, so unbiased 
reporting is free, and reporting costs increase (at an increasing rate) with the size of 
any adjustments. In practice, the costs of earnings management may show up in a 
wide variety of ways, such as a loss in credibility, managerial distraction, the direct 
costs of an audit, increased financial constraint, or the cost of “unwinding” an 
adjustment by under-stating future profits. By adopting a reduced-form quadratic 
cost function, we are emphasizing expositional clarity and convenience over realism. 
The CEO chooses adjustments, 𝑎, to maximize her payoff, which takes the 
following form: 
 
where 𝟏{𝑅≥0} is an indicator function that equals one if and only if the report, 𝑅, is 
non-negative. The CEO’s payoff increases linearly with 𝑅, to capture the idea that 
she would generally like to report better performance. Because she also pays a 





distortions. The parameter 𝐵 is a “bonus” paid to the CEO for a non-negative report. 
This bonus could represent an actual payout, a reduced probability of termination, 
or simply a psychological benefit associated with “not losing money.” Regardless of 
the underlying cause, the bonus produces a discontinuous jump in the marginal 
benefits of earnings management when 𝑅 = 0. This jump is called a “notch” in the 
public finance literature. 
As a baseline model of earnings manipulation, consider the CEO’s report in 
the absence of a notch (i.e., when 𝐵 = 0). Given the linear quadratic structure of 
equation (1), the CEO’s first-order condition reveals that 𝑎∗ =
1
𝛾
. The CEO will always 
make optimistic reports, and the size of her adjustments will naturally decline as the 
cost of misreporting, 𝛾, grows larger. 
Before considering how a notch affects the CEO’s report, it is useful to pause 
and consider the implications of this baseline model for empirical strategy research. 
Because the CEO always makes adjustments, a researcher never actually observes 
“true” performance. On the other hand, this may not matter very much. In 
particular, variation in underlying performance, 𝜋, maps directly into variation in the 
optimal report, 𝑅 = 𝜋 +
1
𝛾
. For example, in a statistical analysis that seeks to explain 
how some factor or decision 𝑋 impacts observed performance 𝑅, all reporting 
distortions can be swept away simply by including a constant term in the regression. 
Unfortunately, this argument only goes so far. In our model, 𝑎∗is constant only 
because the marginal costs and benefits of adjustments are uncorrelated with 𝜋. In 





correlated with 𝜋, 𝑋, or both, leading to well-known problems of omitted variables 
or simultaneity. 
To see how this can happen, consider our baseline model with a notch 
induced by 𝐵 > 0. The CEO now has an incentive to “reach” for the bonus by 
reporting 𝑅 = 0 (or equivalently, 𝑎 = −𝜋), as long as the firm’s true performance is 
close enough to the reporting threshold. In the Appendix, we show that this happens 























Figure 2-1 graphs this optimal reporting strategy and illustrates the 
distribution of 𝑅 when true performance is normally distributed. As illustrated in 
right panel, there is a “hole” in the distribution of reports just below 𝑅 = 0, and a 




] shift their reports upwards to zero. This is the key feature of the 






Although the predictions of this simple model are very stark, they can be 
relaxed. For example, if we allow the marginal cost of adjustment, 𝛾, to vary across 
firms or introduce an idiosyncratic fixed cost of earnings manipulation, then some 
CEO’s may choose to make slightly negative reports. We do not pursue those 
extensions here because the purpose of the simple model is not to capture every 
feature of the data set described below. Rather, our aim is to illustrate a set of 
incentives that can generate bunching in reported profits. We then use the actual 
bunching observed in our data to illustrate how earnings management can distort 
empirical strategy research. 
A final point about the model that merits some discussion is the 
interpretation of the CEO’s choice. Up to this point, we have labeled the variable a 
“adjustments” and assumed that it represents earnings manipulation. Although we 
find that interpretation plausible, one could easily re-label a “managerial effort” and 
argue that a better interpretation of any observed bunching is a try-harder effect 





introduce a second performance measure that is harder to manipulate and show 
that there is a systematic difference in the amount of bunching across these two 
outcomes. Because that approach is fundamentally empirical, we now turn to a 
description of the data. 
CONTEXT: PUBLIC FIRM PERFORMANCE DATA 
Return on Assets (ROA) features prominently in strategy research on the 
drivers of organizational performance. For example, out of approximately 860 
empirical articles published in the Strategic Management Journal between 2011 and 
2020, we found that 238 articles (27%) reference ROA. The popularity of ROA as an 
outcome variable in the empirical strategy literature is due to at least three factors. 
First, ROA is comparable across firms of different sizes, and in theory represents the 
capability of managers to generate value from a stock of resources (Barney, 1991, 
for example). Second, ROA is a key outcome variable used by investors, making it 
reasonable to assume that managers also focus on that outcome. Third, and perhaps 
most importantly, the underlying components of ROA — Net or Operating Income 
and Total Assets — are part of the mandated reporting requirements for publicly 
traded U.S. firms, and are therefore readily available to scholars through the 
Compustat database. 
Because our aim in this paper is to illustrate the potential importance of 
earnings management for Strategy research that takes ROA as an outcome, we also 
use Compustat data. Table 2-1 below reports descriptive statistics, and Table 2-2 





1992-2018. Each table considers two samples. The first sample comprises all firms 
publicly traded in the United States (N=210,797). The second sample (N=171,328) 
excludes firms in the financial sector (standard industrial classification [SIC] codes in 
the 6000s) or public administration (SIC codes in the 9000s) as is common in many 
academic studies that utilize ROA. Both samples are unbalanced panels, with firms 







Most of the variables used in our analysis are quite standard. Net Income, Total 
Assets, and OCF (Net cash flows from operating activities) are incorporated into 
Compustat from the firm’s annual 10-K filings with the SEC. OCF “...is the cash profit 
the company would have reported had it constructed its income statement on a 
cash basis rather than an accrual basis” (Easton et al., 2013, p. 2-17). 
OCF plays an important role in our analysis, and it can be calculated in two 
ways: the direct method (i.e., noting the cash received or cash paid for all operating 





non-cash gains or losses.7 At a conceptual level, Net Income – the numerator of ROA 
– represents the profit or loss of a business using accrual-based accounting, while 
OCF represents the profit or loss from operations using a cash basis.8 Specifically, 
using OCF as a measure of firm performance rather than income-based measures 
removes the effect of investing and financing effects, the effects of interest, taxes, 
and special items, and the effects of non-cash book transactions such as 
depreciation, amortization, or book-value changes in asset or liability valuation. In 
addition to these specific items that would appear as journal entries in the corporate 
accounts, OCF is also not sensitive to broad accounting policy decisions such as the 
choice of inventory valuation method (e.g., LIFO vs. FIFO), when revenue is 
recognized, or allowances for potential outcomes (such as anticipated customer 
returns). Because it is less sensitive to various discretionary choices that managers 
can use to influence reported profit, OCF should be less vulnerable to accounting-
based earnings management than ROA.9 
ROA in a given year for a given firm is calculated by the authors, following 
convention, by dividing Net Income by the Total Assets from the prior year. Similarly, 
 
 
7 Specifically, the items that are removed are typically depreciation/amortization, changes to current 
non-cash assets (such as accounts receivable, inventory), and changes to current non-cash liabilities 
(such as accounts payable). 
8 Some scholars use Operating Income or adjusted income such as Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, 
Depreciation, or Amortization (EBITDA) to calculate ROA. These other income-based measures 
relieve some of the potential error from earnings management, as they strip out certain sources of 
accounting-based discretion, but OCF excludes more potential sources for accounting-based 
manipulation by restricting fully to a cash basis. 
9 There is evidence that firms also use methods in addition to accruals to engage in earnings 
management (Zang, 2012; Roychowdhury, 2006; Graham et al., 2005). Mismeasurement caused by 
these other types of activities may not be detected by our analysis. Thus, our estimates are likely to 
represent a conservative lower bound on the potential impact earnings-management-induced 





OCFOA is calculated by dividing OCF by the Total Assets of the prior year.10 By 
construction, OCF and Net Income are strongly correlated, as are the two 
performance measures ROA and OCFOA.11 Although OCFOA is not widely used as a 
performance measure in the strategy literature, we found only six instances in our 
corpus of SMJ articles, it is clearly linked to operational performance, and for the 
reasons described above, less subject to accounting manipulation than ROA. 
Earnings Smoothing, the final variable listed in Tables 2-1 and 2-2, is well 
known to accounting scholars (Leuz et al., 2003; Dechow et al., 2010) but less 
common in strategy research. It is defined as standard deviation of OCFOA divided 
by the standard deviation of ROA, calculated over the trailing 12 quarters (and 
therefore computed from quarterly rather than annual data). Earnings Smoothing is 
constructed such that a higher ratio indicates smoother earnings relative to the 
underlying cash flows. Many managers prefer smooth earnings paths (Graham et al., 
2005), and the intuition behind this variable is that a large discrepancy between 
variation in operating cash flows and variation in accounting earnings may signal 
that a firm is intentionally smoothing earnings by boosting profit during poorer 
quarters and stashing away profits during good ones.12 It is important to note that 
 
 
10 Total Assets from the prior year is used in order to avoid time reversal, for instance such that 
declines in Net Income or OCF early in the year prompt asset depreciation later in the year. 
11 See Figure C.1 in Appendix C. 
12 Although there are other measures for earnings management/earnings manipulation that hold value 
(for example, the Modified Jones method (Dechow et al., 1995)), comparing variation of earnings to 
variation in cash flows has helpful features for our purpose. Unlike methods that rely on identifying 
and isolating discretionary accruals, this method covers both “real” income smoothing and “artificial” 
income smoothing (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Additionally, this method does not require the existence 





while Earnings Smoothing provides some evidence that earnings are being 
intentionally managed from period-to-period, it does not provide information on 
whether any specific period’s earnings have been shifted, nor what the “true” 
counterfactual earnings should have been. 
Before turning to the analysis, we briefly review the rationale for accrual 
accounting which, when used properly, can add useful information to reported 
earnings. For example, suppose a firm incurs a monthly rental expense of $X that is 
paid in cash 30 days after the 1st of each month. Under cash-based accounting, the 
firm would show monthly expenses of $X, $0, and $2X for January, February, and 
March, respectively. In contrast, because of the matching principle, accrual 
accounting would show an expense of $X in all three months. Because the company 
incurred the liability when it used the facility, the accrual accounting method shows 
a truer picture of the financial impact of this use than the cash-based method. In 
econometric models that use monthly panel data, we might therefore expect ROA to 
produce a better fit than OCFOA. Similar arguments can be applied to a wide variety 
of investment and financing activities. 
On the other hand, accrual accounting implies a degree of managerial 
discretion that can be used to obfuscate underlying performance. Suppose, for 
example, that a firm generates a cash-based loss of $Y in one month by selling 
product A, and a cash profit of $Y the next month selling product B. If the firm makes 
 
 
patterns. Finally, the ratio of standard deviations is more intuitive for a non-accounting audience than 





an accrual to inflate profits in the first month (e.g., by making a more aggressive 
prediction about its receivables), and then unwinds that accrual in the next month, 
the pattern of returns would be $0, $0 under accrual accounting and -$Y, $Y based 
on cash. Consequently, a regression of “product sold” on profitability would produce 
no clear result if ROA is used as the outcome variable, but would show that product 
B is associated with greater profit when using OCFOA. This latter example also 
illustrates why the intuition that earnings manipulation simply “averages out” is not 
correct. Even if all adjustments are eventually reversed, earnings management can 
generate bias in statistical analyses when it is correlated with other variables, such 
as a particular manager or strategy.13 
The preceding discussion suggests that accrual-based accounting can provide 
a better picture of performance over time by matching operational decisions to their 
financial consequences and smoothing out idiosyncratic and “lumpy” cash flows. At 
the same time, accruals may obscure true performance, at least for a while. 
Ultimately, the information content of ROA relative to OCFOA is therefore an 
empirical question whose answer will depend, among other factors, on the amount 
of earnings manipulation and its causes. 
 
 
13 When firms exit a data set (e.g., through bankruptcy, acquisition, or going private) we also may not 





THE AMOUNT OF EARNINGS MANAGEMENT 
Accounting scholars are well aware that there is a discontinuity in reported 
earnings at the zero-profit threshold, and that this “kink” also appears when 
earnings are scaled by share-price (Hayn, 1995) or shareholders’ equity (Burgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997). Figure 2-2 illustrates this discontinuity using an ROA histogram. 
 
The left panel of Figure 2-2 is based on the full sample of all U.S. Public Firms 
from 1992 through 2018. There is a clear spike in the reported ROA distribution at 
zero (the vertical solid line). The right panel omits firms with a primary SIC code in 
the financial, insurance, or public administration industries (SICs in the 6000s and 
the 9000s). Although the large spike at zero becomes less pronounced in the right 
panel, there is still a sharp increase in the probability distribution just above zero. 
Many empirical studies choose to omit firms in the financial sector, and this graph 
suggests there is a logic to that decision, although (as we show below) it does not 
eliminate the measurement problem. 
In the accounting literature, earnings management is generally accepted as 





just above zero (e.g., Burgstahler and Chuk, 2017).14 We are aware of no prior study, 
however, that estimates how much earnings management occurs around that 
threshold. To address this gap, and to provide some sense of the overall the size of 
the potential measurement problem for empirical strategy research, we use a set of 
methods developed to analyze economic behavior around discontinuities in 
incentives (Chetty, 2012; Kleven and Waseem, 2013; Kleven, 2016). In particular, 
Diamond and Persson (2016) suggest a methodology for assessing how much 
probability mass is shifted across a threshold where there is a “notch” in incentives 
(as in the simple model presented above). We apply their method to the ROA 
distribution in Figure 2-2. 
At the core of this methodology is a model of the probability distribution of 
ROA (denoted by 𝑥) that takes the following form: 
 
where 𝑃 is a count of observations at 𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝑥; the 𝛽𝑚 are coefficients of a 𝐾
𝑡ℎ 
order polynomial in 𝑥; the parameters 𝛼𝑥(𝛾𝑥) measure the missing (excess) mass 
due to earnings manipulation below (above) the zero-profit threshold; and 𝜖 is an 
econometric error term. Intuitively, this regression uses a flexible polynomial to 
estimate the un-manipulated counterfactual ROA distribution on the interval [L, U], 
 
 
14 Based on citations, this fact does not appear to be widely known to strategic management scholars. 
For example, Hayn (1995) has not been cited and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) is cited by only one 





and the dummies 𝛼𝑥 and 𝛾𝑥 provide a flexible fit to the actual data in that 
manipulated region. This model assumes that (1) there is a “manipulation zone” 
around zero – specifically inside the interval [L, U] — where the ROA measure is 
distorted, (2) outside of that interval we observe an accurate measure of ROA, and 
(3) the counter-factual (unmanipulated) distribution of ROA is continuous on the 
interval [L, U], so we can extrapolate from a polynomial estimated on data outside of 
the manipulation zone to impute the counterfactual values within. 
To complete this empirical model of earnings manipulation requires that we 
select values for the parameters K, U, and L. To do so, we use the cross-validation 
algorithm proposed in Diamond and Persson (2016), which consists of the following 
steps: 
1. Discretize the underlying ROA data. In practice, we use 200 bins of equal 
width between ROA values of -1 and 1 (i.e., each bin covers .01 units of 
ROA). 
2. Construct five random samples, by selecting N observations (with 
replacement) from the actual ROA data. In each random sample, we treat 
80% of the observations as a training data set, and 20% as a holdout 
sample. 
3. Perform a grid search, looping over feasible values of (K, L, U), and for 
each triple 
a. Estimate equation (2) for given values (K, L, U) on the full dataset. 
Test the hypothesis that ∑ 𝛼𝑥
−1
𝑥=𝐿 = ∑ 𝛾𝑥
𝑈





mass below zero equals the “excess” mass above). If that test 
rejects at the 10% level or better, move to the next triple. 
b. If we cannot reject the hypothesis that missing mass equals excess 
mass, then estimate equation (2) using the values (K, L, U) on each 
of the five training samples, and compute the mean squared 
prediction error (MSE) for the associated holdout sample. Store 
the sum of the MSE across all five test samples. 
4. Choose the values (K, L, U) that produced the lowest aggregate MSE at 
Step 3, and re-estimate that model on the full data set. 
 
The results of this five-fold cross-validation procedure are displayed in Figure 
2-3. The upper (U) and lower (L) bounds of the region of ROA manipulation are 
indicated by dashed lines. Gray circles indicate the number of firm-year observations 
in each ROA bin. Black diamonds represent the counterfactual estimate for that bin 






The left panel in Figure 2-3 plots the actual versus predicted distribution of 
ROA for the full sample, where the cross-validation procedure selected a 12th 
degree polynomial with L = −0.15 and U = 0.08. For that sample, our model implies 
that 15.5 percent of all firm-year observations were shifted from negative to positive 
ROA. 
The right panel in Figure 2-3 shows results if we exclude financial and public-
sector firms from our sample. For this sample, the best-fit model was a 15-degree 
polynomial, with L = −0.15 and U = 0.10. The model implies that 10.5 percent of all 
non-financial firm-year observations were shifted from negative to positive ROA. 
This is almost 30 percent less earnings manipulation than we estimate for the full 
sample, which suggests that manipulation among financial firms, which only 
comprise about 20 percent of the full sample, could be quite substantial. 
Nevertheless, our baseline estimates suggest that around 1 in 10 observations in a 
paper that employs Compustat ROA is prone to systematic measurement error, even 
when excluding the financial sector. In Appendix B we show that an alternative 
methodology that replaces the polynomial in equation (2) with a function of the 
density of OCFOA (under the assumption that OCFOA is not manipulated), yields 
similar results, at least for the non-financials. 
Earnings Management vs. Endogenous Effort 
Earlier in this chapter we noted that there are at least two explanations for 





“try-harder” effect.15 Up to this point, we have focused on measuring the scale of 
the discontinuity (i.e., what share of all reporting is moved from negative to positive) 
and discussed those results in terms of earnings manipulation. We now consider two 
complementary approaches that help to rule out explanations other than earnings 
manipulation. The first method uses the Earnings Smoothing measure described 
above, and the second exploits the idea that OCFOA is harder to manipulate than 
ROA. 
Figure 2-4 shows a binned scatterplot of the mean of Earnings Smoothing 
conditional on ROA. We have overlaid on this graph a fitted regression line with 
confidence intervals and indicated the manipulation region identified as described 
above using dashed vertical lines. For both the full sample and the sample excluding 
financial-sector firms, we observe a sharp (discontinuous) increase in earnings 
smoothing when ROA is just above zero. This indicates that when firms report small 
positive values of ROA, they also tend to exhibit a sudden increase in the ratio of the 
variance in accounting earnings to the variance in OCF. Moreover, because these 
variances are computed within-firm (over the trailing 12 quarters), the evidence of 
earnings manipulation in Figure 2-4 is not simply an implication of the baseline 
discontinuity illustrated in Figure 2-3. Put simply, the firms bunching just above zero 
 
 
15 In the literature on bunching, round numbers and psychologically important thresholds are called 
focal points. The effort-based explanation for bunching near focal points has been advanced in other 





in the ROA distribution are also characterized by an unusually low level of earnings 
volatility relative to their cash flows. 
 
If we expand our gaze, moving away from the discontinuity at zero ROA to 
consider the entire manipulated region of the ROA distribution, it becomes clear 
that Earnings Smoothing is lower at negative levels of ROA, and higher when ROA is 
positive. This is a natural consequence of accounting conventions. Firms with higher 
underlying profitability are less constrained in their ability to smooth earnings, 
because some financial slack is required in order to reallocate resources. After 
peaking at an ROA of 5 to 10 percent, the relationship between ROA and Smoothing 
turns negative, perhaps because managers feel less pressure to manipulate earnings 
when the business is performing well. 
To the extent that our measure of Earnings Smoothing captures what it 
purports to measure, Figure 2-4 provides direct evidence against the hypothesis that 
bunching in the ROA distribution at zero is caused by endogenous effort rather than 
earnings manipulation. As another test, however, we can apply our cross-validation 





the same threshold. Under the maintained assumption that it is more difficult for 
CEOs to manipulate cash flow than accounting earnings, we would expect to find 
less evidence of OCFOA manipulation. Figure 2-5 shows the results of that exercise. 
The top two panels in the Figure compare ROA to OCFOA manipulation for 
the full sample, and the bottom two panels compare ROA to OCFOA manipulation 
for the non-financials.16 It is clear even from visual inspection that the size of the 
discontinuity around zero and the subsequent bunching above zero is dramatically 
reduced by using the cash-basis performance measure of OCFOA rather than the 
accrual-basis performance measure of ROA. For the full sample, our estimates imply 
that four percent of the observations are “shifted” from negative to positive OCF. In 
the non-financial sample, we estimate that the amount of earnings manipulation is 
negative. Instead of “missing” mass below zero, there are slightly more negative 
observations that were predicted. This evidence, we interpret as essentially no sign 
of left-to-right OCFOA manipulation. 
 
 







The analyses in this section yield three basic facts. First, there is a substantial 
amount of earnings manipulation (on the order of 15% of all firm-year observations) 
around the zero-profit threshold. Second, manipulation is especially prevalent 
among firms in the financial sector. Third, there is much less manipulation of OCFOA, 
and essentially none for non-financial firms. We have considered a number of 
supplemental analyses and robustness checks that further support these findings. 
First, we checked whether Earnings Smoothing was continuous at the zero-
OCFOA threshold, and whether OCFOA was continuous at the zero-ROA threshold. In 





to achieve positive cash flow, and that real-earnings management (i.e., manipulation 
of OCF to achieve positive ROA) is confined to the financial sector.17 Both results are 
consistent with our findings that accounting earnings are more prone to 
manipulation than cash flows. 
Second, as an alternative to the specification in equation (2) that relies on 
functional form to estimate the counterfactual density of ROA in the interval [L, U], 
we developed a model that uses OCFOA to predict ROA. This approach rests on the 
maintained assumption that OCFOA is not manipulated, and as a result, works better 
for the sample that excludes financial-sector firms. The results, provided in Appendix 
B, indicate that around 6 percent of firm-year observations in our non-financial 
sample are manipulated.18 
Finally, there is a concern that the missing mass in our figures might be 
caused by a liquidation option for struggling firms. In particular, if those firms most 
likely to post accounting losses leave the dataset due to bankruptcy, acquisition by 
another firm, or being taken private, that could produce a “hole” in the earnings 
distribution just below zero. This hypothesis does not explain the bunching of 
reported earnings just above zero. Nevertheless, we have replicated our main 
results on a dataset that excludes firms that exit the Compustat before the end of 
the sample period (regardless of whether the exit was due to bankruptcy, 
liquidation, leveraged buyout, etc.) with substantially similar results. 
 
 
17 See Figure C.3. 





EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY RESEARCH 
Having established that there is a large amount of earnings manipulation 
near the zero-profit threshold, the question remains whether this “matters” for 
empirical strategy research. To address this question, we return to an old but 
influential line of studies that seeks to attribute variation in performance to firm, 
industry, and macro-economic factors (e.g., Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt et al., 1991; 
McGahan and Porter, 2002).19 Our goal is not to replicate prior studies, or to address 
any of the methodological shortcomings of variance decomposition that are well-
documented in previous studies. Rather, we aim to show how the results of this type 
of analysis change when we move from ROA to OCFOA as a measure of firm 
performance. 
Our analysis will consider two ways in which earning manipulation might 
matter. First, it may add “classical” measurement error that reduces the overall 
explanatory power of a model. Second, and more importantly in our view, earnings 
management might be correlated with other variables (e.g., if it is more prevalent in 
specific industries, and linked to certain CEOs). To the extent that earnings 
manipulation is correlated with other factors, it has the potential to introduce bias 
into analyses that use ROA as an outcome. 
The foundational studies in this literature estimated models that might 
include year, industry, firm, and/or business-unit fixed effects. By comparing the 
 
 
19 One measure of the importance of these papers is common to find their results described in the early 





model R-squared for different combinations of variables, it is possible to compute 
how much total variance is explained by each of the observed factors. One limitation 
of using OCFOA in this context is that operating cash flows are not required to be 
reported at the business segment level, and therefore a direct replication of the 
classic studies is not possible. In particular, our “industry” effects are based on the 
primary SIC code assigned to the firm as a whole, rather than to an individual 
business unit. On the other hand, we can extend upon the early papers by using the 
Execucomp data set to include CEO fixed effects, following later scholars in this 
literature stream (e.g. Mackey, 2008)). 
Our analysis is based on the following model for the generation of reported 
accounting profit: 
 
In this equation, 𝑟𝑡,𝑗,𝑖,𝑘 is either the ROA or OCFOA reported in a given year 𝑡 
by a specific firm 𝑗 operating within industry 𝑖 and led by CEO 𝑘. 𝜇 is the average 
accounting profit over the entire sample (the constant in the regression models), 
and the other variables represent fixed effects for the year (𝛾𝑡), the industry (𝛼𝑖), 
the firm (𝛽𝑗), and the CEO (𝛿𝑘), as well as the error term ( 𝑡,𝑖,𝑗,𝑘). 
For the sequential ANOVA model, we incrementally added fixed effects for 
year, industry, firm, and CEO to gauge the marginal contribution of R-squared gained 
with the addition of each set of fixed effects. This approach was used by scholars 
earlier in this literature stream, but has a significant flaw of being sensitive to the 





Porter (2002) and Mackey (2008). In sequential ANOVA, variance that could be 
explained by either of two nested levels of fixed effects will be attributed to the first 
one added to the model. 
This drawback is alleviated by the second approach, a simultaneous ANOVA 
model. In the simultaneous model, variance that could be explained by more than 
one factor is not attributed to either of them. This has the benefit of avoiding 
misattribution of explained variance, while it also has the drawback of leading to 
lower estimates of variance explained for each category, as the ambiguous cases are 
not attributed at all. However, the total R-squared for the full model with all fixed 
effects is not understated even if the category breakdown may be (i.e., the total R-
squared for the model exceeds that of the sum of the categories). 
Figure 2-6 presents the results of the explanatory value of the full models for 
both ROA and OCFOA, sequential and simultaneous, for both all industry and non-
financial industry samples. The key finding here is that our ability to predict/explain 
variance in OCFOA exceeds that of ROA by approximately 10 percentage points 
across all specifications. As the entire point of accrual accounting is to add salient 
information and remove noise from cash-basis performance, the 10 percentage 
points of explained variance should be considered a fairly conservative lower bound 
for how much obfuscation appears to be introduced by strategic accounting 
decisions. Not only are accruals not giving us a clearer picture of underlying financial 





noise ratio in the most common measure of performance used in the strategy 
literature. 
 
If earnings management introduces measurement error in ROA, under what 
conditions should we be concerned with bias rather than merely a loss of efficiency? 
If earnings management caused primarily classical measurement error in ROA, it 
would not cause us great concern when using ROA in our econometric models. 
When we used ROA as an outcome variable, this would simply reduce the efficiency 
and increase the standard errors around our coefficients. When ROA was used as an 
explanatory variable, it would attenuate the coefficient towards zero, which is often 
toward a more conservative interpretation, i.e., pulling our inference towards the 
null (Bound et al., 2001). But unfortunately, there is reason to believe that the 
measurement error caused by earnings management on ROA is non-classical. 
The key assumption of classical measurement error is that the error itself is 
uncorrelated with values of the measure, but also that the error is uncorrelated with 
other variables in the econometric model (Hyslop and Imbens, 2001). We saw from 





was not evenly spread across all values of ROA. Indeed, it is concentrated enough in 
a region of ROA to cause visual discontinuities in the distribution. 
In addition to the correlation with ROA itself, there is also reason to suspect 
that the measurement error from earnings management is correlated with other 
variables that may be in our econometric equations. An easy way to see this is in 
looking at the differential impact using OCFOA vs. ROA has on the amount of 
variance explained in each category of fixed effects in the ANOVA models. Figure 2-7 
shows the breakdown of explained variance for each of the categories of the 
ANOVA—year, industry, firm, and CEO. Across the models, the relative explanatory 
power of firm and industry lowered when using ROA rather than OCFOA, while the 
relative explanatory power of CEO and year increased.20 In the all-industries nested 
ANOVA model, this effect is large enough to change the rank order of CEO and 









One interpretation of the results in Figure 2-7 is that certain CEOs are more 
likely to manipulate earnings, so that moving from ROA to OCFOA as the focal 
measure of firm performance causes the share of variance attributed to CEO effects 
to decline, and the share of variance explained by firm and industry-level factors to 
increase. 
CONCLUSIONS 
We make three contributions in this study. First, we provide new evidence on 
the prevalence of earnings management, a well-known problem that has resisted 
precise measurement or quantification. We find evidence that 10 to 15 percent of 
firm-year observations in Compustat exhibit earnings manipulation. Our estimates 
also indicate that earnings manipulation is more prevalent in the financial sector, 
thereby providing a firmer empirical foundation for the “folk wisdom” that one 
might want to exclude financials when analyzing firm performance with accounting 
data. These finding augment the literature using regression discontinuity designs 
(Burgstahler and Chuk, 2017), studies leveraging discretionary accruals (Dechow et 
al., 1995) or accrual reversals (Dechow et al., 2012), and survey designs targeting 
chief financial officers (Graham et al., 2005) by employing novel methods from the 
econometrics literature on bunching. 
Second, these bunching methods are employed to evaluate alternative 
performance measures. We find that OCFOA exhibits less manipulation, and thus 
provides a method by which scholars can test the sensitivity of models including 





dovetails with current efforts to rethink and improve how we measure performance 
(Lieberman, 2021; Lieberman et al., 2017; Wibbens and Siggelkow, 2020). 
Finally, we deploy our insight about OCFOA to re-evaluate a classic set of 
strategy papers that uses variance decomposition to understand the drivers of firm-
performance (Schmalensee, 1985; Rumelt et al., 1991; McGahan and Porter, 1997, 
2002). Our results suggest, counter-intuitively, that we can explain more of the total 
variance in cash-based rather than accrual-based accounting performance. Moving 
from ROA to OCFOA also reduces the amount of variance in firm-performance 
associated with CEO effects, which suggest that some CEOs are more likely to 
engage in manipulation than others. 
Our findings have implications for empirical work where firm performance is 
measured using accounting profit. For many studies, restricting the sample to non-
financial firms and utilizing OCFOA as a performance measure for accounting 
profitability offers a simple way to avoid potential econometric problems created by 
earnings management. More generally, researchers should carefully consider 
whether firms’ unobserved propensity to inflate profits could be correlated with key 
outcomes or explanatory variables. In some cases, such as when ROA serves as an 
ancillary control variable, this will not be especially problematic. But when ROA is 
the outcome, and key explanatory variables might be correlated with the propensity 
to manipulate, researchers should explore sensitivity to using OCFOA. Our findings 
also suggest that these issues may be particularly salient when exploring the 





Although the strategic management literature provides an extensive toolkit 
for analyzing firm performance and value creation, we often take accounting and the 
measurement of these constructs for granted. In our view, empirical scholars could 
be more attuned to “how the sausage gets made” when it comes to performance 
measurement, because it is fertile ground for future research on how earnings 
measurement affects strategic decision-making within the firm and value creation 







Chapter 3: When Performance Isn’t Performance – Earnings 
Smoothing, Performance Feedback, and Strategic Change 
INTRODUCTION 
The behavioral theory of the firm (BToF) predicts that performance below 
aspirations leads to subsequent search and organizational change (Cyert and March, 
1963; Gavetti et al., 2012). Firm performance and aspirations in the performance 
feedback literature based on BToF are commonly measured through financial 
outcomes (Posen et al., 2018), most often firm earnings scaled by a factor of firm 
size like sales or assets (Shinkle, 2012). But managers have some control over 
reported earnings, and in egregious examples, managers can choose to misrepresent 
financial data when performance falls well below aspirations (Harris and Bromiley, 
2007). 
Even when operating within regulatory constraints, such as generally 
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for U.S. firms, managers have discretion with 
which they can inflate or deflate earnings in a given period. A common use of this 
discretion is to engage in earnings smoothing, which is a type of earnings 
management where profits are inflated during lean years and deflated during flush 
years to reduce the variability of earnings (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). Because it 
involves increasing reported profits during down years, earnings smoothing can thus 
decrease the frequency and magnitude of shortfalls below aspirations of reported 
performance. This creates a theoretical tension not addressed by the literature—if 





when actual performance would have led to a shortfall, do managers base 
subsequent search and change activities on the privately observed performance or 
the publicly reported performance? 
Firms choose whether to smooth earnings and whether to engage in 
strategic change, so drawing causal inference is difficult due to the possibility that 
these two actions are jointly determined as part of a cohesive plan or both affected 
by unobserved endogenous processes. This study isolates exogenous variation in a 
firm’s ability to engage in earnings smoothing using two instrumental variables—
variation in gains and losses from special items, and industry peer levels of earnings 
smoothing. This exogenous variation is used to explore 1) whether earnings 
smoothing increases the likelihood of reported performance at or above aspirations; 
2) whether earnings smoothing leads to lower propensity for strategic change; and 
3) whether having reported performance above aspirations accounts for the lower 
propensity for change. 
This paper’s primary contribution is presenting evidence that managers 
engaged in earnings smoothing are less likely to make substantive change in major 
resource allocations and that this effect is at least partially explained by the firm 
reporting profit at or above organizational aspirations. This finding suggests that for 
many firms, the financial performance they publicly report may have more salience 
than financial performance they privately observe in the performance feedback 
process. The implications of earnings smoothing on firm strategy have not been 





analyzing how earnings smoothing and its effects on reported financials are related 
to downstream resource allocation decisions. Finally, post hoc analysis shows that 
the relationship seems to persist even after the implementation of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) even as managers shifted earnings smoothing behavior 
away from discretionary accruals toward operational smoothing. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
What is Earnings Smoothing and Why Does It Occur? 
The accounting literature has identified the widespread practice of earnings 
management, defined as using managerial discretion over accounting and operating 
activities to strategically generate accounting earnings (Phillips et al., 2003). The 
phenomenon of earnings management has been studied in the accounting literature 
primarily from the focus of predicting how, when, why, and by whom earnings 
management happens. There is a wealth of research on detecting earnings 
management (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995), the motivations for engaging in 
earnings management (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Ronen and Yaari, 2008; 
Degeorge et al., 1999), and different accounting, audit, and public policy changes 
that can curb earnings management behavior (Becker et al., 1998; Healy and 
Wahlen, 1999). However, there is relatively little attention in the literature on the 
firm’s subsequent strategic choices. 
Earnings smoothing is a particular type of earnings management in which 
managers lower profits in ‘good’ years and inflate profits in ‘bad’ years (Ronen and 





both the peaks and valleys. Managers can use discretion over accounting accruals to 
create profit or loss for an accounting period, such as by a change in inventory 
valuation methodology that changes the book value of the firm’s inventory asset or 
by modifying allowances for the percent of customers on credit who will not pay in 
the long run. In addition to accounting accruals, managers can time operational 
decisions to shift earnings backwards or forwards in time. For example, if a firm is 
likely to miss a key earnings target for a fiscal period, it may contact a key customer 
and offer them an additional discount to encourage them to purchase sooner. This 
can create the appearance of a higher short-term performance while the effect on 
the future period will not be observed until later. There is evidence that firms use a 
combination of both accounting earnings management (AM) and operational 
earnings management (OM) as a joint strategy that depends on the relative 
costs/benefits of each (Zang, 2012). 
Managers may have several motivations to engage in earnings management. 
They may have individual incentives to adjust earnings up or down, including 
compensation through bonuses or stock options, avoiding termination, or setting 
better pricing for a leveraged buyout offer by management. Additionally, there are 
several benefits to the firm that can accrue from inflating or deflating earnings, such 
as avoiding breaches of bond covenants, achieving better pricing on initial public 
offerings or seasoned equity offerings, or getting the most bang for the buck on 
stock-based mergers and acquisitions (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). The need for external 





motivation for earnings management (Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos, 2017) over 
and above the personal financial incentives of the managers as individuals. 
There is evidence that suggests earnings smoothing is common among U.S. 
firms, that managers overwhelmingly prefer smooth earning paths to volatile ones, 
and that they are willing to forego long-term value to achieve smooth earning paths 
(Graham et al., 2005). Indeed, 78 percent of the chief financial executives 
interviewed by Graham et al. (2005) admitted to sacrificing long-term value to 
smooth earnings, which suggests that this practice is widespread and impactful. 
Additionally, there is evidence suggesting that within GAAP earnings smoothing to 
meet market expectations can lead down a “slippery slope” to fraudulent 
manipulation outside of GAAP for some firms (Chu et al., 2019). If, as the results 
presented below suggest, managers engaging in earnings smoothing are less likely to 
engage in subsequent strategic change, they may engage in more and more 
manipulation when faced with a string of poor performing periods in lieu of 
addressing underlying problems. This could be an interim mechanism explaining 
how firms come to find themselves choosing to engage in egregious financial 
misconduct when facing large performance shortfalls that Harris and Bromiley 
(2007) observe. 
Behavioral Theory, Earnings Smoothing, and Aspirations 
A core aspect of BToF is that organizations have target levels for their 
performance (aspirations) and at salient points of evaluation will gather feedback on 





March, 1963). Aspirations are context-specific levels that form discontinuities or 
thresholds influencing firm decision-making; as originally conceived, a salient 
aspiration was a performance level deemed acceptable, and organizational behavior 
could be viewed as “satisficing,” or trying to achieve this acceptable performance 
level by boundedly rational actors rather than attempting to fully optimize (Simon, 
2013; March and Simon, 1958). Subsequent work has greatly fleshed out how 
organizations set aspirations, adjust aspirations, and reconcile multiple aspirations 
(see Shinkle (2012) for a review), but the core construct of what an aspiration is has 
remained quite stable from the initial framing. 
Harris and Bromiley (2007) noted that in the original conception of BToF, 
managers were assumed to act within ethical bounds, and in their work proposed 
relaxing this assumption. For public firms, which must report performance 
periodically through the release of financial statements, Harris and Bromiley (2007) 
suggested that if the managers observe private feedback on performance indicating 
a likely shortfall below aspirations, one available option for search was to engage in 
financial misrepresentation to inflate the reported performance. This same logic 
could apply to more common earnings smoothing activities that fall short of the 
egregious financial misrepresentations studied by Harris and Bromiley (2007). 
Earnings smoothing increases reported performance during bad years, which 
could in itself increase the likelihood that a firm reports above an aspirational 
threshold in a given year. But aspirations may also be important in terms of guiding 





that there is increasing marginal cost and risk to inflating earnings, then it would be 
sensible for managers to inflate earnings until they were over the most salient 
organizational aspiration but not substantially higher due to increasing costs. 
Likewise, if a firm is having unexpectedly high actual performance in a period and 
wants to stash some of those profits in a “cookie jar” from which they can inflate 
future periods, the firm presumably would not stash so many profits as to bring 
reported performance under a salient aspirational threshold. Therefore, aspirations 
would serve as the bar which earnings inflating firms would want to get above from 
one direction while also serving as the floor which earnings deflating firms would 
want to avoid breaching from the other. The net effect of this should be that firms 
engaging in the most earnings smoothing should be most likely to report earnings 
bunched just above the most salient organizational aspiration. 
There are three types of organizational aspirations included in this analysis: 
historical aspirations, social aspirations, and natural aspirations. The firm’s own past 
performance level is referred to as a historical aspiration and has generally been 
measured as originally formulated by Cyert and March, as an exponentially weighted 
moving average of the firm’s performance in the most recent previous periods. 
Scholars have analyzed different speeds at which historical aspirations are updated 
from most recent performance (e.g., Greve (2002); Audia and Greve (2006); Harris 
and Bromiley (2007)), but in general it is common to theorize that the most recent 





In addition to this self-comparison, the BToF predicts that firms will set social 
aspirations based on social comparisons to firms that are similar or that compete 
with the focal firm (Cyert and March, 1963). In earlier research, this was conceived 
as a relation of a firm’s performance to an aggregate of firms in its industry, but 
recently it has been refined to recognize that there may be multiple social 
aspirations that may be more or less salient to a firm and that a firm’s competitive 
set does not necessarily correspond to an industry. For example, Moliterno et al. 
(2014) noted that rather than (or in addition to) the average performance of 
comparison firms, there may be other social thresholds that are more salient if they 
are closer to the firm’s historical performance. They specifically study the possibility 
of a top performance aspiration, which is the threshold above which an organization 
can be considered among the elite of their class. Moliterno et al. (2014) also study 
survival thresholds—a level under which the organization is no longer thought of as 
in its previous class. Other scholars have also explored more nuanced definitions of 
what other firms comprise a focal firm’s reference group for social comparison 
(Massini et al., 2005; Vissa et al., 2010). Kacperczyk et al. (2015) have suggested that 
there may be different effects of performance on risk and change from different 
levels of analysis (individual vs. organizational) and from inter-firm vs. intra-firm 
social comparison, and other scholars have noted that responses to performance 
relative to historical aspirations and social aspirations may be distinct, and that 





Finally, there is an argument that there are natural aspirations based off 
thresholds that are salient due to the nature of our base cognitive processes or 
context-specific incentives. Often, the threshold between gains and losses is drawn 
from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) and then extrapolated to an 
organizational level as it may represent the status quo (Greve, 2003). There are two 
natural aspirations, positive vs. negative profits and earnings above or below 
financial analyst expectations, that seem to be salient in the minds of chief financial 
executives and their anticipation of how financial markets will react (Graham et al., 
2005). Additionally, accounting scholars have documented a discontinuity or “kink” 
in the distribution of firm earnings at zero profits and relative to consensus analyst 
estimates that may be indicative of earnings management (Hayn, 1995; Burgstahler 
and Dichev, 1997; Degeorge et al., 1999; Burgstahler and Chuk, 2017), lending 
credence to the idea that simply avoiding posting a loss for the financial period and 
avoiding posting earnings below analyst estimates may be salient motivators for 
managers to smooth earnings. 
The first hypothesis, below, translates the predictions from the accounting 
literature to harmonize with the notion of organizational aspirations from the BToF: 
 
H1. Firms engaging in higher levels of earnings smoothing will be more likely to post 






Behavioral Theory, Earnings Smoothing, and Strategic Change 
Central to the BToF is the notion that when firm performance falls short of 
organizational aspirations, the firm is more likely to engage in subsequent search 
and change than had the firm met or exceeded aspirations (Cyert and March, 1963). 
While this core prediction is elegant, extrapolating how organizations change and 
how such change can be measured across industries, time periods, and firms can be 
daunting. The performance feedback literature has studied a range of organizational 
changes thought to be generated by this process up to and including strategic 
change, which generally denotes significant changes to core operations of a firm, for 
example, in the firm’s product-market offerings (Greve, 2003). 
While studies of individual industries have used appropriate context-specific 
measures to detect meaningful strategic change (such as Greve (1998) study of radio 
station programming format changes), several scholars conducting broad cross-
industry studies within the strategic change literature have used a more generalized 
index of a firm’s resource allocation changes (e.g., Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990); 
Carpenter (2000); Zhang and Rajagopalan (2010)). These studies draw from the core 
idea that a firm’s strategy can be thought of as a mosaic of important decisions 
(Mintzberg, 1978) and that change in where a firm’s resources are allocated reflects 
a change of that mosaic. Strategic change in this case can be thought of as actions 
that “move the needle” on key resource indicators and thus rise to a level of 





Introducing earnings smoothing into the performance feedback process 
creates an interesting theoretical tension—namely that organizational performance 
is separated into actual performance (generally private information observed by 
management) and reported performance (what managers report on public financial 
statements). These two measures of performance can diverge to the extent that 
managers inflate or deflate a given period’s return. When both actual and reported 
performance fall on one side of aspirations or another, the baseline predictions of 
BToF should govern. But when actual performance experiences a shortfall while 
through earnings smoothing the reported performance meets or exceeds the 
aspiration, subsequent strategic change could be based off actual performance, 
reported performance, or a combination of both. Let’s explore each potential 
scenario before stating a formal hypothesis. 
Earnings Smoothing Predicts Higher Strategic Change. There is a potential 
mechanical relationship between earnings smoothing in one period and some 
component measures of strategic change in following periods that could result in a 
positive relationship bias. Managers engaging in earnings smoothing to prop up a 
bad period do so by temporarily increasing gains (e.g., early recognition of revenues) 
or decreasing costs (e.g., by delaying expenses). Artificially inflating or deflating 
resource allocations for one period could cause the appearance of change in the 
next period when levels regress to the mean or even swing the other way as 
temporary accruals are reversed. Essentially, for firms to create artificial smoothness 





components of earnings by changing various levers driving costs or revenue. This is 
the very premise underlying common accounting measures for earnings 
management that are based on odd or unexplained variation in accruals (such as the 
modified Jones model; Dechow et al. (1995)). Aside from this slight positive bias, 
there does not seem to be a compelling theoretical reason to expect earnings 
smoothing to cause substantial strategic change. 
Earnings Smoothing Does Not Predict Strategic Change. There are many 
benefits to attaining certain benchmarks on a firm’s financial statements that are 
independent to whether managers deem underlying actual performance as 
satisfactory. It is plausible that managers inflate during poor performing years to 
achieve various tactical objectives (e.g., maintaining a stable or increasing market 
price for stock shares, avoiding breach of debt covenants, decreasing cost of capital, 
attaining higher individual compensation, etc.) while basing strategic decisions on 
the private information they have on actual performance. In this case, earnings 
smoothing would serve principally as window dressing or audience management, 
and greater earnings smoothing in a given period would not predict strategic change 
in future periods. This case serves as the null hypothesis. 
Earnings Smoothing Predicts Lower Strategic Change. Building on Hypothesis 
1, if earnings smoothing increases a firm’s likelihood of attaining aspirations with 
reported performance, this could explain why earnings smoothing in one period 
would predict lower strategic change in a subsequent period. If this were true, it 





salient to strategic change at least partially independent of actual performance. 
There are multiple plausible mechanisms by which this could occur. Even if firm 
managers are aware that they had a performance shortfall in reality, reporting 
performance above aspirations may relieve pressure from external stakeholders, 
which could be a primary impetus for change. Additionally, if the assumption of firm 
managers perfect observation of underlying performance is relaxed, other potential 
mechanisms become plausible. If substantial earnings smoothing activity occurs 
below the level of corporate leadership (i.e., at the business unit level or below), 
then they may not clearly observe actual performance due to information 
asymmetry within the firm. Performance reporting may be a ritualized process of 
quantification similar to that for budgeting described by Mazmanian and Beckman 
(2018), where one set of “reified” numbers becomes the agreed upon performance 
communicated both internally and externally. In this case, the firm managers 
responsible for strategic change decisions may be relying on smoothed performance 
information somewhat regardless of the process of “making the sausage.” 
Hypothesis 2, below, also draws on Harris and Bromiley’s (2007) proposed 
extension of BToF—managers facing a shortfall in actual performance below 
aspirations may choose to inflate reported performance as part of a menu of options 
for search. While Harris and Bromiley’s context was that of egregious financial 
misrepresentation, the logic holds when extended to the ethically gray area of 
within-GAAP managerial discretion. Essentially, earnings smoothing to improve 





would be address the underlying shortfall of actual performance. Earnings 
smoothing represents temporary, artificial changes rather than permanent shifts of 
committed resources. In fact, if the earnings smoothing is done purely through 
accruals, resource commitments and operations may not even be affected at all. 
Thus, earnings smoothing within GAAP is generally less costly and less risky than 
many other types of organizational change and may therefore be judged by some 
managers as a palatable alternative to more meaningful change. Based upon these 
theoretical points, Hypothesis 2 predicts a negative relationship between earnings 
smoothing and subsequent strategic change, and Hypothesis 3 predicts that 
aspiration attainment (the proposed mechanism) mediates the relationship. Figure 
3-1 provides a visual depiction of the theoretical mediation model with a summary 
of the hypotheses. 
 
H2. Firms engaging in higher levels of earnings smoothing in preceding periods will 
have lower levels of overall strategic change in the subsequent period. 
 
H3. Attainment of organizational aspirations mediates the relationship between 








DATA AND METHODS 
Data Sample 
The data sample studied covers approximately 30 years (1988-2018) of 
accounting data from publicly traded U.S. firms. The data were accessed using a 
merged database from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and 
Compustat. The sample is an unbalanced panel, with firms entering in 1988 or the 
first year they are listed in Compustat (typically around the time of their IPO) and 
exiting in 2018 or the year they ceased operations or being publicly traded. The 
primary data analysis includes all industries for the broadest coverage; for 





Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in the 6000s (financial sector) or 9000s (public 
administration and miscellaneous sectors), as is typical in such studies. 
Summary statistics and cross-correlation coefficients can be found in Table 3-
1 and Table 3-2. There are a total of 302,619 firm-year observations in the dataset, 
although there are substantially fewer observations for some measures. The lower 
number of observations corresponds primarily to missing values (for example, some 
firms do not have R&D or advertising expenses) or the need for an additional year of 
data per firm due to the use of lagged or forward values. 
Identification Strategy 
The primary threat to causal identification is the endogenous choices to 






not randomly make these choices, but rather choose for an anticipated benefit or 
advantage. It’s plausible that both earnings smoothing and downstream resource 
change are jointly determined as one decision or are both caused by other variables, 
which would introduce omitted variable bias if we cannot adequately control for 
them with observables. 
The ideal experiment to address this threat would be to exogenously restrict 
a firm’s capability or motive for engaging in earnings smoothing without otherwise 
affecting the firm’s likelihood to change resource allocations. Then, if we can 
accurately measure how much a firm smooths its earnings, whether it reports 
performance above or below a salient financial aspiration, and how much its major 
resource allocations change in the following periods, we could recover an average 
treatment effect. In this case, the firms that are randomly restricted from smoothing 







There are policy shocks that have affected a broad range of firms incentives 
to smooth earnings or the relative cost/benefit of earnings management of a 
particular type, but the policies with the most impact (e.g., the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002; SOX) also have ripple effects that could substantially affect a firm’s resource 
change decisions outside of this mechanism. Cohen et al. (2008) document a notable 
effect of SOX on the practice of earnings management (specifically a shift away from 
accrual-based earnings management to real earnings management) which for some 





tail end of the 2001 recession, with other macro-level effects (collapse of the dot-
com bubble, market crash following the terror attacks of 9-11) that present 
challenging confounds for the specific outcome variable—resource change.  
We can, however, use a near-best approach of using two instrumental 
variables to isolate exogenous variation in earnings smoothing that have previously 
been utilized in the accounting literature. The first is to exploit the variance of 
income from special items as an instrument. Special items as an accounting category 
constitutes gains or losses that are outside normal day-to-day operational, investing, 
and financing activities. They are frequently short-term, one-off occurrences and 
hence by this nature hard to predict or forecast far in advance. The key assumption 
for the use of this instrument is that the more special items fluctuate, the more 
difficult it is to smooth earnings, as managers have less time to pull the levers 
needed. This makes these items a source of income variation that is hard for 
managers to foresee and to plan for far in advance, which in turn makes it difficult to 
smooth earnings. While it is the ideal of random assignment, this approach attempts 
to exploit quasi-random restrictions on a manager’s ability to predict what earnings 
are likely to be and manipulate it higher or lower.  
A concern about this instrument is whether managers use income from 
special items as a category for transactions with which to smooth earnings (which 
could create reverse causality in the first stage). Indeed, there has been significant 
scrutiny and guidance released by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) 





reason for comfort is that one of the effects of required reporting on this category 
increases the visibility and scrutiny of gains/losses here. This increased visibility and 
scrutiny makes detection of earnings manipulation in this category (intentionally) 
more likely, and thus a less appealing place to smooth earnings. Secondly, if 
managers were using special items as a lever with which to smooth intertemporal 
variance, then we would see a positive correlation between the variance of special 
items and the earnings smoothing measure. In fact, there is a negative correlation in 
this first stage, which is more in alignment with variation in special items reflecting 
exogenous conditions making it more difficult to smooth earnings. 
The second instrumental variable used in the study is the average level of 
earnings smoothing (excluding the focal firm) within the industry, defined as the 
firm’s primary four digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) code. 
The anticipated relationship is that a firm in an industry where its peers/competitors 
have higher levels of earnings smoothing will also have higher levels of earnings 
smoothing, and therefore we should expect the first stage of this instrument to 
reflect this positive correlation. The idea of using this instrument is that by isolating 
variation in earnings smoothing to that predicted by how much smoothing industry 
peers are engaging in, we are approximating exogenous constraints on a firm’s 
choice to smooth. An industry with low levels of earnings smoothing may indicate 
that firms within it have fewer transactions or balance sheet items that provide 
sufficient discretion to smooth; or perhaps the industry is under closer scrutiny by 





concern for the second instrument is that by nature of its construction has 
substantial correlation with industry effects or characteristics. Additionally, the 
strength of the first stage is not as strong as the special items instrument due to the 
coarse nature of using industry effects to predict constraints on firm behavior. 
However, while imperfect, using this instrument as a way to remove the effects of 
possible joint determination of earnings smoothing and strategic change (as 
managers are presumably limited in their control over industry peer behavior) helps 
us gauge sensitivity to that particular threat to inference. 
The final concern to address with using these instruments is the possibility 
for violations of the exclusion restriction. It is plausible that the instruments could 
have direct effects on the outcome variables independent of those through the 
explanatory variable. This study uses econometric techniques from Conley et al. 
(2012) to relax the assumption of exclusion restriction and account for the direct 
effects in the second stage of the 2-stage-least-squares models (2SLS). 
As pointed out by van Kippersluis and Rietveld (2018), ideally, we should 
select a non-parametric way to estimate the direct effect of the instruments in the 
absence of a strong theoretical reason to assume a certain value. One approach is to 
regress the outcome variable on both the variable of interest and the instrument for 
a sample of the population independent of the first-stage treatment. Put another 
way, for the first instrument, we want to partial out the effect of earnings smoothing 
using those firms for whom their level of smoothing is not determined by the 





aspirations or changing resources. Likewise, we would need to do the same with 
industry peer smoothing to recover its direct effect on aspiration attainment or 
changing resources. 
The good news is that the two instruments, when controlling for the 
explanatory variable, controls, and fixed effects are orthogonal to each other. 
Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the predicted values of the explanatory 
variable from the first stage with one instrument will be independent of the 
endogenous first stage effects of the other. Therefore, by including the special items 
instrument in the 2SLS model instrumenting for peer smoothing, we can recover the 
direct effect of special items on aspiration attainment. Conversely, we can repeat 
this step by swapping the two instruments and recover the direct effect of industry 
peer smoothing. This of course must be repeated for each outcome variable, as the 
direct effects would be different for each one. 
MEASURES 
Outcome Variable: Resource Change 
Consistent with previous literature on strategic change (Weng and Lin, 2014; 
Zhang and Rajagopalan, 2010; Haynes and Hillman, 2010; Finkelstein and Hambrick, 
1990), this study operationalizes strategic change as variation in resource allocation. 
The general approach is to measure period-to-period absolute value change in the 






As in previous studies, six broad measures of resource allocations are 
standardized and integrated into a combined measure, titled Resource Change in 
this study. These are: advertising intensity (total advertising expense / total sales), 
research and development (R&D) intensity (total R&D expense / total sales), plant, 
property, and equipment (PPE) newness (net PPE / total sales), nonproduction 
overhead ratio (SG&A expense / total sales), inventory levels (total inventory / total 
sales), and financial leverage (total debt / common stockholders’ equity). The 
component measures are labeled Advertising Change, R&D Change, PPE Change, 
SG&A Change, Inventory Change, and Debt/Equity Change, respectively. Because 
change is measured as an absolute value, either increases or decreases in any of 
these component measures will result in a higher value for Resource Change. Thus, 
the measure is agnostic about the directionality, but rather is intended to capture 
distance from one period’s resource allocation to another. For example, developing 
capabilities in a new product category would tend to show up as an increase in R&D 
expense. Changing from traditional manufacturing to just-in-time production would 
show up as a decrease in inventory expense. Significantly upgrading and retooling 
production facilities would show up as in increase in relative PPE value. Each of 
these would register as an increase in Resource Change. 
Resource Change as an index has a Cronbach’s alpha of .64 for this data 
sample, which is slightly lower than the benchmark of .65 or .7 typically used to 
gauge how closely related the components of the index are. This cautions against 





other supportive evidence. Accordingly, in addition to the combined measure, the 
specifications for Hypothesis 2 will include each of the six components as the sole 
outcome variable to check whether results hold for each of these measures as well 
as the combined index. Natural log transformations are used for the individual 
components of Resource Change due to their exponential distribution to better fit a 
linear model. Additionally, while the main analysis measures Resource Change over 
the subsequent period from time 𝑡 to time 𝑡 + 1, results for both two-year and 
three-year change are included in the supplemental analysis. 
Explanatory Variable: Earnings Smoothing 
Measuring earnings smoothing is challenging in that we do not directly 
observe the counterfactual of what the firm’s earnings would have been without 
adjustment/manipulation. Additionally, firm managers have incentives to be covert 
about this behavior so that their efforts are not easily detected, unwound, and 
accounted for by financial analysts and markets. The more opaque that managers 
can make such adjustments, the less potential risk of detection and subsequent loss 
in terms of lost reputation/credibility or the increased chance of regulatory action 
from the SEC. While we cannot pinpoint and measure the delta or direction in which 
reported earnings are being manipulated, we can draw from the accounting 
literature a proxy that indicates a lower or higher likelihood that earnings smoothing 
is present. 
There are two general approaches to detecting earnings management. The 





expected to have, given various observables about its industry and firm 
characteristics (revenue growth, normal ratio of accounts receivable to total sales, 
etc.). A scholar would then look for anomalies they could attribute to discretionary 
accruals deviating from this expectation. One challenge with this approach is that it 
requires a period in which the firm or its industry peers are presumed to be not 
manipulating, from which the appropriate level of non-discretionary accruals can be 
inferred. This works well in cases such as an event study measuring the effect of a 
public policy change or change within the firm (e.g., the appointment of a new CEO) 
where there is a strong theoretical reason for believing there will be more 
manipulation in one period than another. Unfortunately, this is not the case for this 
study. A second challenge is that techniques leveraging discretionary accruals would 
only measure “accounting” earnings smoothing, but not “real” earnings smoothing. 
So while this method would detect the use of accounting discretion used to manage 
earnings, the use of operational discretion to achieve this effect would be missed. 
Since scholars have found evidence suggesting that managers use a combination of 
accounting and real earnings smoothing to achieve their targets (Zang, 2012), this 
method would potentially miss out on a substantial portion of the phenomenon. 
The second general approach to measuring earnings smoothing, and the one 
used in this study, is to look for a disparity in the quarterly variance of earnings 
compared to operating cash flows (OCF). OCF can be thought of as the “cash profit 
the company would have reported had it constructed its income statement on a 





does not include accruals, it omits this source of accounting-based manipulation. 
Additionally, OCF is not commonly itself a targeted outcome by which firms are 
judged on their performance, and so presumably, OCF would pick up on changes in 
the levers driving real earnings smoothing without itself being a target for such 
smoothing. Put simply, if the variance of quarterly earnings is much lower than the 
variance of quarterly OCF, then it is more likely that a firm is either using accruals to 
remove volatility in operations (accounting-based earnings smoothing) or timing 
reversals in operating activities to achieve a similar effect (real earnings smoothing). 
While this doesn’t give us an explicit direction of manipulation for any given period 
(as would the modified Jones method), it does give us a more comprehensive 
measure of when manipulation is more likely overall, which better suits the needs of 
this study. Earnings Smoothing is calculated as the ratio of standard deviation of OCF 
(scaled by total assets) over the standard deviation of net income (scaled by total 
assets) over the previous 4 quarters. A natural log transformation is used due to the 
variable’s exponential distribution to better fit a linear model. Robustness checks 
using the previous 8 and 12 quarters are included in supplemental analysis. 
Mediating Variable: Aspiration Attainment 
Measuring aspirations for financial performance builds on a rich tradition 
within the performance feedback literature. Key predictions of the Behavioral 
Theory of the Firm surround the setting, attaining, or falling short of performance 
aspirations (Cyert and March, 1963). As Bromiley and Harris (2014) note, there are 





measured, but financial performance aspirations have most commonly been 
operationalized by comparing firm return on assets (ROA) to the ROA from previous 
periods or that of peer firms (Audia and Greve, 2021). Audia and Greve make a 
compelling call for considering multiple organizational goals, and while this study 
considers the limited scope of earnings-based financial goals (as those are most 
relevant to the phenomenon of earnings management), four different potential 
types of aspirations are included that may be salient to organizations depending on 
context. Based on the findings of Bromiley and Harris (2014), the aspirations are not 
averaged or combined, but rather are assumed to have salience distinct and 
independently from one another. 
There does not appear to be a strong theoretical prior for why one type of 
financial aspiration measure may hold more salience than others for driving earnings 
management behavior. Because this study is intended to be broad in scope (30 years 
across all industries), it is reasonable to expect that one aspiration may be more 
salient in a particular firm/industry/year context, while another more appropriate as 
the context changes. This study utilizes two types of aspirations that are the most 
commonly studied in the BToF tradition: the firm’s recent historical performance 
and that of its referent peers. The specific operationalization of these measures 
match those most commonly found in the performance feedback literature: 
Historical Aspiration is a binary variable indicating whether the firm’s ROA in the 





Aspiration is a binary variable indicating whether the firm’s ROA meets or exceeds 
the industry average ROA for the firm’s four-digit NAICS code. 
Additionally, the study utilizes two aspirations drawn from the accounting 
literature for which there is evidence of driving earnings management behavior. The 
first is the threshold between profit or loss, i.e., zero ROA. While not as common in 
the performance feedback literature, Greve (2003) refers to this aspiration as a type 
of “natural aspiration level” at which there is a discontinuity of incentives. This type 
of aspiration also traces back to Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
which, when extrapolated from individual-level behavior to the organizational level, 
has been referenced in the BToF tradition as a shift in firm behavior near the 
boundary between gains and losses. The variable Zero Profit is a binary variable 
indicating whether the firm reported ROA at or above zero for the period. 
The second aspiration measure taken from the accounting and finance 
literature on earnings management is the analyst consensus projections of the firm’s 
earnings per share (EPS) for the period. Managers are attentive to and will release 
financial guidance to try to shape the expectations of analysts assigned to their 
industry or firm. A firm’s stock price is also sensitive to whether a firm meets or 
exceeds these expectations. This is a sound reason for why there has been previous 
empirical findings that some firms engage in earnings management to meet or beat 
analyst expectations (Degeorge et al., 1999). The variable Analyst Consensus is a 
binary variable indicating whether the firm reported EPS meeting or exceeding the 






There are two instrumental variables used in this study: variation in special 
items and industry peer earnings smoothing. The rationale and implications of these 
variables are described above, in the Identification Strategy section. Special Items is 
calculated as the natural log of the standard deviation of special items scaled by 
beginning period total assets over the previous 4 quarters. Peer Smoothing is 
calculated as the mean level of Earnings Smoothing in the firm’s four-digit NAICS 
code, omitting the focal firm. 
Control Variables 
Several control variables are included in the models below in order to partial 
out the effects of firm characteristics could plausibly affect both the explanatory and 
outcome variables. These fall into three main categories—the size or maturity of the 
firm; the level of financial strain or bankruptcy risk facing the firm; and the level of 
slack resources available to the firm. These are represented by Firm Size and Firm 
Age; Altman’s Z-Score; and Financial Slack and Organizational Slack, respectively. 
Additionally, time- and firm-level fixed effects are included to account for 
unobserved heterogeneity that may cause additional omitted variable bias. Natural 
log transformations are used for Firm Size, Firm Age, Financial Slack, and 
Organizational Slack due to their exponential distribution to better fit a linear model. 
Altman’s Z is divided by 1,000 for ease in tabular layout as the coefficients were 





Firm Size. Firm Size could quite plausibly affect strategic change; this could be 
through several mechanisms, including organizational inertia, a more complex cost 
or investment structure, or the existence of more stakeholders who need to buy in 
on significant shifts of strategy. There appears to be a positive correlation between 
Earnings Smoothing and Firm Size, and it is plausible that firm size could affect the 
motivation for or opportunity to engage in earnings smoothing. Larger firms may be 
under more pressure and scrutiny by investors and financial analysts to hit quarterly 
targets. Additionally, having a larger firm may create a more complex financial and 
operational structure, which could provide more tools or opportunities with which 
to smooth earnings. Empirical studies on strategic change often control for firm size 
either by including a measure based on revenues, assets, or number of employees. 
This study utilizes firm revenues, as it should be appropriate across a wide selection 
of industries. 
Firm Age. The number of years a firm has been in operation could affect both 
strategic change as well as the motivation or opportunity to smooth earnings. More 
mature organizations may have more entrenched procedures and norms that create 
barriers to redeploying resources or changing fundamental capital structures. 
Mature organizations may be held to a higher standard of consistency in hitting 
earnings targets by investors and financial analysts or may be more willing to 
smooth due to managerial belief that they understand the ebbs and flows of their 





between the firm’s first appearance in Compustat (beginning in 1950) and the fiscal 
year of the focal quarter. 
Altman’s Z-Score. Many scholars from the tradition of the behavioral theory 
of the firm have suggested that poor performance could be a major driver of 
organizational search and change (Gavetti et al., 2012). However, if financial ruin is 
facing a firm, some scholars theorize that an organization-level phenomenon parallel 
to the individual psychology phenomenon of threat rigidity could occur, suppressing 
the organization’s propensity to engage in strategic change (Staw and Ross, 1987; 
Staw et al., 1981). Essentially, the firm is overwhelmed with the immediate task of 
treading water and is either unable or unwilling to make drastic organizational 
changes or take on additional risk. This study utilizes a proxy variable for the risk of 
financial ruin developed by Altman (1968) as a way to compare the relative credit 
risk of various publicly traded firms. A higher Z score is associated with a low risk of 
bankruptcy or default, while a low Z score is associated with a high risk. Financial 
strain could also affect the capacity a firm has to smooth earnings, since it is 
believed that there must be some flexibility in the financial system to engage in 
period-to-period smoothing (Ronen and Yaari, 2008). 
Financial Slack. Financial Slack is a measure of how much capital is easily 
accessible by the firm. Having such slack could make it more feasible for a firm to 
engage in strategic change, as there are often costs associated with such transition. 





firm cannot engage in earnings smoothing due to financial constraints. The measure 
is constructed by taking the ratio of current assets over current liabilities. 
Organizational Slack. Organizational slack is similar to financial slack in that it 
represents flexible resources that managers can apply in different ways to 
implement strategy. It should represent the excess capacity available to a firm over 
and above the bare bones level of expenditures necessary to conduct the core 
business functions. Organizational slack in this way represents the resource 
allocations that can be trimmed to effect change, as well as the flexibility in cost 
structure that managers can tweak to shift earnings from one period to another. 
Additionally, a key part of the organizational search and learning literature concerns 
the notion of slack search—or excess capacity as being a key to innovating new 
technology (Levinthal and March, 1981). Accordingly, there is reason to believe that 
this variable may be correlated with both strategic change and earnings smoothing, 
and therefore should be included as a control. Organizational Slack is the total 
amount of firm expenses scaled by total assets. 
Time- and Firm-level fixed effects. Time-fixed effects are included in the 
models to account for unobserved heterogeneity correlated with the time period. 
Firm-level fixed effects are also included to more stringently address potential 
sources of unobserved heterogeneity. These fixed effects isolate the within-firm 
variation and partial out all between-firm variation. While this is effective at 
removing the bias that comes from firm characteristics that tend to be stable over 





firms that engage in different activity. Since earnings smoothing tends to be longer-
term strategy managers employ, a substantial part of the variation in the 
independent variable is inter-firm rather than intra-firm. Therefore, while the firm-
fixed effects address additional OVB concerns, they may understate the magnitude 
of the relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable 
because of the variation discarded. 
RESULTS 
Presented below are the main results and analyses for the three hypotheses 
of the study, but the reader is also directed to the supplemental tables and figures. 
While the primary analyses focus on the results of the fully identified models, the 
supplemental tables in Appendix D include an iterative build-up of models from 
simple OLS to include the addition of controls, fixed effects, and each instrument in 
sequence for all outcome variables discussed. Additionally, specification maps 
detailing key choices such as time period (for example, whether Earnings Smoothing 
and/or Resource Change covers 1, 2, or 3-year periods), the exclusion of financial 
firms from the analysis, or the restriction of sample to the post-SOX period are 
included in the supplemental tables so that the reader can see the effects of these 
choices on the coefficients of interest for each variable and model specification. 
Before diving into the analysis for each hypothesis, the primary results and 
main takeaway of the paper can be best visualized by the graphs in Figure 3-2. These 
graphs are histograms of firm-year performance relative to the four aspiration levels 





industry average ROA, zero profits (which is simply the firm’s reported ROA), and the 
EPS forecast from a consensus of analysts. If the firm reported exactly at the 
aspiration level, it would be a zero on the x-axis of this graph. The positive region are 
firm-years where reported performance surpassed the aspiration, the negative 









scatter plots of both Earnings Smoothing (the solid diamonds) and Resource Change 
(the open circles). It is worth remembering that Resource Change is measured at 𝑡 +
1 relative to the other variables, so this represents the association of Earnings 
Smoothing and performance on Resource Change over the following fiscal year. 
What is most noteworthy about these graphs is that they depict 1) a negative 
relationship between Earnings Smoothing and Resource Change, 2) that Earnings 
Smoothing tends to be highest in the proximity around the aspiration level (zero on 
the x-axis), and 3) Resource Change tends to be lowest at or slightly above the 
aspiration level. This allows us to intuitively visualize the theoretical premises 
discussed earlier—earnings smoothing is a tool to manipulate period-to-period 
reported accounting profit to more consistently achieve aspirations; these aspiration 
levels may provide salient targets for managers to aggressively reach for when they 
would otherwise fall short as well as targets for how much profit to understate if 
they are overperforming for the period; and finally, that the mechanism of more 
consistently reporting performance at or above aspirations could dampen pressures 
for the organization for strategic change. 
Now that we have an overall picture of these variables, let’s drill down into 
the specific hypotheses. Hypothesis 1 predicts that earnings smoothing will lead to a 
higher propensity for attaining organizational aspirations. First, Figure 3-3 depicts 
binned scatter plots of simple OLS regression of aspiration attainment on Earnings 










were generated with the binsreg command in Stata (Cattaneo et al., 2019). The y-
axis can be interpreted as the probability of attaining the aspiration for a given value 
of 𝑥. As Earnings Smoothing is a log-transformed measure, a .01 increase along the 
x-axis can be interpreted as a 1 percent increase in the ratio of the standard 
deviation of a firm’s cash flows to the standard deviation of its earnings. The 
binscatter plots show a positive relationship between Earnings Smoothing and 
aspiration attainment as hypothesized. The fit is approximately linear across the 
meat of the distribution of earnings smoothing, which gives some comfort about the 
linear assumptions of OLS for these specifications. 
Table 3-3 presents the results of OLS models with year and firm fixed effects 
(Models 1.1-1.4), as well as the fully specified models that are 2-stage-least-squares 
(2SLS) utilizing the two instrumental variables (Models 1.5-1.8). The coefficients of 
interest are on Earnings Smoothing and the columns represent the four aspiration 
types. We see that the coefficients of interest are positive, as hypothesized, and of 
high enough magnitude to have economic significance. For example, the 0.180 
coefficient on Model 1.7 can be interpreted as a 1 percent increase in Earnings 
Smoothing leading to a 0.180 percentage point increase in the probability that the 
firm posts above the natural aspiration level of zero—i.e., posts a profit for the 
period rather than a loss. Looking further down the table, we see that the first stage 
of the instruments are strong and in the hypothesized direction. The expectation 










fits with the negative coefficient on this instrument. Likewise, the expectation of 
more earnings smoothing by industry peers causing higher focal firm earnings 
smoothing also fits with this instrument’s positive coefficient in the first stage. The F-
test of the excluded instruments is comfortably high, alleviating concerns associated 
with weak instruments. 
It is noteworthy that the joint test of overidentification (Hansen’s J statistic) 
is too high to give comfort. This reinforces concerns that the assumption of exclusion 
restriction for the instruments does not strictly hold. That is, the instruments 
themselves appear to have a direct effect on the outcome variable independent of 
that through the explanatory variable. Accordingly, this calls for the techniques 
pioneered in Conley et al. (2012) and refined in van Kippersluis and Rietveld (2018). 
This method allows us to see what the effect is on point estimates and standard 
errors for the coefficients of interest when we relax the exclusion restriction 
assumption. 
This was conducted by using the plausexog command in Stata (Clarke, 2014), 
which estimates the second stage of the 2SLS adding a direct effect for each 
instrument. The “union of confidence intervals” approach was used, where a 
confidence interval of potential direct effects for each instrument is given and then 
the union of all confidence intervals for the coefficient of interest is inferred as a 
total range. 
The results of adjustment to relax the exclusion restriction assumption are 





adjusted point estimates, and the estimated upper and lower bounds of the 
adjusted coefficient. The estimates are still in the hypothesized direction (positive), 
with a tight enough confidence interval to provide comfort in interpreting the 
results. 
 
For Hypothesis 2, the same approach is repeated. We begin as before with 
binned scatter plots of a simple OLS regression with mean-centered controls (Figure 
3-4). The topmost graph in the figure represents Resource Change, the combined 
index variable consistent with previous literature on strategic change. However, 
because there is concern about how well the index functions as a latent construct 
(e.g., the Cronbach alpha of .63 is near but just below traditional levels of fit), each 
of the six subcomponents of the measure are also pictured (left to right and top to 
bottom, change in advertising intensity, R&D intensity, PPE newness, nonproductive 










see a clear negative relationship between Earnings Smoothing and change in the 
next period. The relationships are fairly consistent and approximately linear across 
each of the outcome variables. 
Tables 3-5 and 3-6 present the results of OLS models with controls and fixed 
effects and the 2SLS models with the two instruments. Each column represents a 
different outcome variable, with the Resource Change as the left-most column and 
the sub-component measures to the right. The second hypothesis predicts that 
higher levels of earnings smoothing will lead to lower levels of resource change in 
the subsequent period, so we should expect a negative coefficient of interest on 
Earnings Smoothing. We do indeed see negative point estimates consistent with the 
hypothesis, with relatively tight dispersion signified by low standard errors. Earnings 
Smoothing is a log-transformed measure and Resource Change is an average of the 
standardized values of the sub-components, which makes interpreting the economic 
significance a bit challenging. Therefore, the sub-components are presented in 
unstandardized form. They too are log-transformed, therefore the interpretation is 
easier: percent change in the explanatory variable leading to percent change in the 
outcome variable. For example, model 2.10 estimates that a 1 percent increase in 
Earnings Smoothing leads to a 0.187 percent decrease in R&D Change. 
We see again that the first stage of the instruments are strong, but the 
Hansen J statistics for three of the models give concern for direct effects of the 
instruments on the outcome variables (Models 2.8, 2.11, and 2.12). Accordingly, the 















the effects of relaxing the strict assumption of exclusion restriction for these three 
models. Table 3-7 presents the results of the adjustments. For each of the models, 
we see both a point estimate in the hypothesized direction as well as a confidence 
interval comfortably in the negative region. It is noteworthy that bias from direct 
effects seems to be on net in the opposite direction of the main effect, giving 
comfort that the model specifications are not at risk of spurious inference from this 
particular threat. 
 
Hypothesis 3 predicts that aspiration attainment mediates the relationship 
between earnings smoothing and strategic change. This analysis uses the three tests 
suggested by Baron and Kenny (1986), 1) that the explanatory variable affects the 
mediator, 2) that the explanatory variable affects the outcome variable, and 3) that 
when the indirect path is controlled, the direct effect is more attenuated toward 
zero (with full mediation at zero). They also suggest performing a Sobel z-test to 
determine significance of the indirect path. While other scholars have demonstrated 
advanced methods that are more efficient for this last test, such as bootstrapping 
(Zhao et al., 2010; Hayes, 2009), the simpler traditional Baron and Kenny approach is 






The results for Hypotheses 1 and 2 correspond to the first two criteria 
suggested above. Table 3-8 corresponds to the third. The leftmost column presents 
the fully specified Model 2.8 as comparison. To the right, Models 3.1-3.4 represent 
individually controlling for aspiration attainment for the four types of aspirations, 





interest on Earnings Smoothing. By comparing models 2.8 and 3.5, we can see that 
there is an approximately 40 percent reduction (from -0.0518 to -0.0316) in the size 
of the main effect when controlling for the indirect pathways. Additionally, the Sobel 
z-scores for each aspiration independently in Models 3.1-3.4 are high enough to 
suggest mediation in each case. 
CONCLUSION 
Earnings smoothing is a widespread behavior (Graham et al., 2005) that can 
have substantial consequences for firms and stakeholders. In addition to the ethical 
questions around whether the intentional manipulation of earnings higher or lower 
in a given period has any long-term information value or is by its nature misleading, 
there are important questions about how engaging in such behavior has 
downstream effects on other strategic decisions. This paper answers one of those 
questions by studying the effects of earnings smoothing on subsequent strategic 
change. 
The first contribution of the paper is to the performance feedback literature. 
While accounting scholars have previously theorized and found evidence that 
managers smooth earnings to avoid reporting losses, to meet previous performance, 
and to meet analyst expectations (Degeorge et al., 1999), this behavior is not often 
discussed in the context of performance feedback. This study extends these findings 
to social aspirations (one of the core aspirations from BToF) and then connects this 





This raises important theoretical questions. When managers have 
performance near but below salient thresholds, an available option may be to 
temporarily inflate earnings to present to external audiences purported 
performance above salient thresholds. If managers are presumed to know actual 
performance (i.e., before manipulation), then are subsequent decisions about risk 
and change driven by the inward-facing feedback (which would be a shortfall) or by 
the outward-facing feedback (which would meet aspirations)? 
The second contribution of the paper is to theorize and identify a causal link 
between earnings smoothing and strategic change. Harris and Bromiley (2007) 
suggested that firm managers performing poorly may grossly overstate earnings 
instead of engaging in substantive change, but the context of their study was on 
egregious manipulations that violated GAAP and constituted financial fraud. This 
study applied similar logic to the context of the dubious gray area of within-GAAP 
earnings smoothing rather than plainly illegal behavior. It is plausible that behavioral 
differences between outright fraud and within-GAAP manipulation are more than 
simply a matter of degree, but a lower propensity for strategic change may very well 
be a “slippery slope” mechanism by which a struggling firm proceeds from within-
GAAP earnings smoothing to financial fraud. Further research on this potential link is 
warranted. 
The third contribution of the paper is to demonstrate that approximately 40 
percent of the main effect of earnings smoothing on strategic change seems to occur 





mechanism within this relationship, but there is also room for future work on the 
other mechanisms through which this may be occurring. For example, Mazmanian 
and Beckman (2018) describe the process of budgets and earnings forecasting as 
creating a single “reified” set of numbers promulgated throughout the organization. 
If earnings smoothing is part of this process, it could reduce the visibility of and 
sensitivity to volatility or risks in the firm’s environment from the perspective of 
individuals within the organization. Thus, the possibility of the organization “fooling 
itself” could also be a part of the story. An unpacking of this possibility, or on other 
effects of intra-firm information asymmetry could yield further insight. 
The final intended contribution is in the leveraging of two instruments that 
are orthogonal to each other as a tool for non-parametric estimates of each 
instrument’s direct effects on outcome variables. van Kippersluis and Rietveld (2018) 
suggest selecting subsamples for which the first-stage relationship is zero between 
the instrument and the explanatory variable. In the absence of strong theoretical 
reasons for such subgrouping, using instruments exogenous to one another as a way 
of constructing these subgroups by using instrumented values of the explanatory 
variable in turn is a useful way to more systematically leverage the techniques of 






Appendix A: Derivation of 𝜋𝐿 
To find the lower threshold of the “hole” in reported earnings (i.e., 𝜋𝐿), we 
can look for solutions of 𝑈 (
1
𝛾
; 𝜋) = 𝑈(−𝜋; 𝜋). At that point, the CEO is indifferent 
between making a larger adjustment that achieves the bonus 𝐵 or staying with the 
locally optimal report 𝑎∗ =
1
𝛾
. Substituting into equation (1) and simplifying leads to 
the quadratic equation  
𝛾
2
∙ 𝜋2 + 𝜋 + (
1
2𝛾
− 𝐵) = 0 
The roots of this quadratic are 𝜋 =
−1±√2𝛾𝐵
𝛾
. The larger root cannot be the 
solution, because for 𝜋 >
−1
𝛾
 the CEO would obtain the bonus under her “normal” 
reporting strategy 𝑎∗ =
1
𝛾
















Appendix B: Alternative Bunching Estimates 
Blomquist and Newey (2018) critique the use of bunching estimators in 
public finance to estimate the tax elasticity of income using kinks or notches in the 
tax schedule. The core of their argument is that identification rests on functional 
form assumptions. In particular, within the region where outcomes are assumed to 
be manipulated, bunching methods impute counterfactual outcomes entirely from 
extrapolation, rather than any comparison of observed quantities. For example, if 
the true counterfactual distribution of ROA is highly non-linear around zero, then 
the estimates of earnings management that we report in Section 4 could be biased. 
Setting aside any debate over the practical implications of this critique, there 
is a natural solution available in our empirical setting. If we assume that OCFOA is 
not manipulated, then the relationship between OCFOA and ROA helps identify the 
counterfactual distribution of ROA within the manipulated region. To implement this 
idea, we use the following model: 
 
where 𝑃 is the number of observations with ROA equal to 𝑥, 𝐶𝐹𝑥+𝑇 is the number 
observations with OCFOA equal to 𝑥 + 𝑇, and all other parameters are defined as in 
equation (2). Comparing (4) to (2), it should be clear that we have simply replaced 
the polynomial previously used to extrapolate ROA in the region [L, U] with a linear 





The reason we allow for the OCFOA distribution to be shifted relative to ROA 
is that operating activities are normally a profit center, so OCFOA generally exceeds 
ROA (e.g., due to taxes, depreciation, etc.). We select a value of 𝑇 using the cross-
validation procedure described in Chapter 2, searching over 𝑇 rather than 𝐾 (the 
degree of the polynomial). Figure B.1 shows the resulting histogram for all firms as 
well as the non-financial sample. As for earlier figures, the upper (𝑈) and lower (𝐿) 
bounds of the region of ROA manipulation are indicated by dashed lines, gray circles 
indicate the number of firm-year observations in each ROA bin, and black diamonds 
represent the counterfactual estimate for that bin imputed from the model. 
 
For both panels, the cross-validation procedure selected a leftward shift of 5 
bins for OCFOA (𝑇 = 5). The left panel shows the results from the full sample, which 
has a lower bound (𝐿) of -0.13, an upper bound (𝑈) of 0.09, and a total amount of 
displaced probability mass of 16.8 percent. The right panel shows the results from 
the non-financial sample, which has a lower bound (𝐿) of -0.14, an upper bound (𝑈) 
of 0.09, and a total amount of displaced probability mass of 6.4 percent. In both 





distribution of OCFOA has a more pronounced peak than the counterfactuals based 
on a polynomial approximation. This can be seen by comparing Figures B.1 and 2-3. 
Finally, we note the spike in the predicted values of ROA just below zero in 
the left panel. This corresponds to a discontinuity in the distribution of OCFOA for 
financial firms that can also be observed in the top right panel of Figure 2-5. We 
interpret this spike as evidence of real earnings management (i.e., manipulation that 
also influences OCF) by financial firms. It suggests that the approach used in this 
Appendix will work better for the non-financial sector, whereas the standard 
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